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ABSTRACT
As India grows, driven by its success in information technology and services, there is another
revolution waiting to happen in the Retail sector dependent on whether the Government of India can
unshackle the various inefficiencies that are keeping this industry constrained. Retail in India is
estimated at nearly US$ 400 billion and is growing at a CAGR of 9 percent (AT Kearney GRDI 2010).
96 percent of this sector remains un-organized and constitutes a workforce that have taken to self-
employment for daily subsistence due to an overcrowded agriculture sector and lack of employment
opportunities for lesser skilled workers in the manufacturing or services sectors. Food and groceries
form nearly 60 percent of India's retailing followed by, among others, clothing and footwear at a
distant 9 percent of retail. Despite the size of this market, retail and its food supply chain remains
unorganized and inefficient. A lack of investment, technology and process control in the agriculture
supply chain leads to tremendous waste accounting for nearly 25-30% of fruits and 10% of grains
produced. Also, the related and supporting industries for food processing, cold chains and crafts
remain nascent.
In a grim reflection on the situation, a politician in India recently remarked that Indian consumers buy
shoes in air-conditioned stores but food on the streets. Despite this scathing but accurate comment,
the debate on whether to organize retail remains unresolved. This debate is further complicated by
intellectual and political debate on the impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), by large
international retailers like Wal-Mart, on the fate of small retailers. Interestingly, both these
questions have been on the table of policy makers in India for more than 15 years and the
Government has so far only allowed some FDI in 'single-brand' retailing and 'wholesale trading' of
retail goods. While the incumbent Congress party led Government has voiced many reasons to
organize retail and allow FDI in multi-brand retailing, public opinion in response to a discussion paper
released by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) - Ministry of Commerce &
Industry - has been negative.
In my quest to decipher whether India should organize and allow FDI in multi-brand retail, I have
analyzed all the opinions received by the DIPP. I posit that the data is skewed and not sufficient to
form the basis of a policy decision. I have also conducted an extensive literature review on the
impact of Wal-Mart on small retailers to understand the potential impact it can have on India.
Despite the concerns, I conclude that this change can be managed to India's advantage and that
opening of the retail sector to FDI is an imperative, not an option.
Thesis Supervisor: Donald R. Lessard
Title: Epoch Foundation Professor of International Management
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
My thesis evaluates whether India should further liberalize its foreign direct
investment (FDI) policy for the retail sector. My primary source of data is the set of
suggestions received by the Government of India, in response to a Discussion Paper
floated by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP) asking for public
opinion on whether India should open FDI in multi-brand retail. This question is of
large significance for developing countries where retail is predominantly unorganized
and managed through domestic players. Many developing countries including Mexico,
Brazil, Argentina, Thailand and China have already taken steps towards organizing retail
by allowing foreign retail to enter. The approach across countries is not consistent and
tailored to their specific needs. Success also has not been consistent, either for the large
retailers or for countries. It is for this reason that the data presented by the DIPP offers
a unique opportunity to analyze and offer a hypothesis for India, who is currently in the
midst of taking a decigon on whether it will organize retail and if so, will it allow foreign
retailers.
Currently, the Government allows foreign participation up to 51% through the
approval mechanism for single brand retailing and up to 100% through the automatic
approval route for foreign investments in establishing cash-and-carry (wholesale)
trading. Foreign equity participation in retailing more than a single brand, i.e. multi-
brand retailing, is banned. Therefore, while Tommy Hilfiger can establish its brand of
clothing and sell to consumers in India, Wal-Mart cannot open its stores which carry
more many brand and products, to sell to consumer directly. Wal-Mart and other multi-
brand retailers can only sell to retailers, through the cash-and-carry, business-to-
business format. These restrictions do not apply to domestic private companies who
may open large format multi-brand stores to sell to consumers directly.
The size of the retail market in India in estimated at nearly US$ 320 billion
growing at a CAGR of 13%, where 96% of the market is unorganized and managed
through mom-and-pop stores and small merchants. The private sector in India has not
been able to organize and capture value from this market for various reasons, including
the lack of infrastructure, i.e. roads, cold chains, small land-holdings and lack of scale
from farmers, lack of financing etc. On the other hand companies like ITC Limited,
PepsiCo and McDonalds have shown the way for Indian and foreign companies to
partner directly with farmers to leverage efficiencies. Given this demonstrated success
and the slowing down of retail growth in the developed countries, India presents a
unique and large market for large format, international retail stores like Wal-Mart, who
are experts at managing complex supply chains and know how to most effectively invest
in and manage the end-to-end process for maximum benefit.
The existence of such a large, growing, un-organized and under-developed retail
market in India presents a unique wealth and value creation opportunity for private
players, both domestic and international, the Government and the people of India.
Debate on whether to liberalize this sector has continued since 1991 and remains
unresolved. The two divergent views and issues in this discussion are:
1) FOR: India's economic growth is highly skewed towards growth from its
technology and services sector, leaving behind a sluggish manufacturing industry
and an over-crowded agriculture sector. Many believe that India's growth post
liberalization has been achieved by addressing its self-imposed licensing regime
which previously restricted both foreign and domestic industry. For growth to
continue, proponents of further liberalization believe that India now needs to
take a more detailed look at its various sectors, especially agriculture, and
introduce the reforms necessary for growth and development to be more broad-
based and sustainable. A majority of India's population istill employed in an
over-crowded agriculture sector and the Ministry of Finance, acknowledges in
their latest Economic Survey (2011), that the technological benefits gained from
the first green revolution are waning. India's performance in global trade is still
a small fraction despite having resources including the 2nd largest arable land
point, and being the largest producer of wheat, rice, pulses and milk. Despite
these resources, a significant quantity of agricultural produce is wasted either
due to logistical inefficiencies or the lack of processing the agricultural produce.
2) AGAINST: Large format international retailers are known to capture the power in
the market and drive out small mom-and-pop stores. This phenomenon has been
observed in the United States with Wal-Mart and in other countries. The
evidence for this phenomenon is well documented and perhaps beyond any
doubt. Opposition in India against large format international stores lies
predominantly in this argument. For the fear psychosis that this creates in the
public, no political party is willing to "bell the cat" and risk the angst of the voting
public. Whether the voting public will indeed be against this action is untested;
but in today's age of coalition politics, this is not something a political party in
power in willing to test at risk of losing confidence from its voters.
India is clearly at the juxtaposition of whether it should open its economy for
further growth or whether it maintains its veil of autarky and keeps the foreigner's out.
Interestingly, India is not alone in this asking this question. Many other developing
countries are going through their own process of organizing retail and though there
have been some initial hiccups, countries including Chile, Brazil, Thailand, Mexico have
all adopted organized retail. To understand this issue from an Indian context, I have
organized my thesis around the following three questions:
1) Should retail be organized in the first place? Why?
2) If it should be organized, should it allow foreign players like Wal-Mart? What is
the risk?
3) What is the view of the people of India? What should India do?
Should Retail be organized in the first place? In a paper titled, "Retail - More
Bad than Good" (Guruswamy, 2005) - the authors argue that India's pattern of high-
skilled services led growth, combined with a sluggish manufacturing industry and an
over-crowded agriculture sector has lead to low employment opportunities for the
masses. This has resulted in the creation of small mom-and-pop stores, not as a matter
of choice but that of forced employment by way of unorganized, unlicensed small shops
and road-side hawkers of fruits, vegetables and other small household items. Another
paper on the Impact of Organized Retailing on the Unorganized Sector published by the
Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) demonstrates
that only 7% of mom-and-pop shop owners want their children to follow suit. Various
publications, including the GOI discussion paper, argue that the existing form of
agriculture procurement from farmers is monopsonistic in nature and highly
exploitative of farmers at the upstream; and at the downstream, the traders wield a
monopolistic power over small retailers including mom-and-pop stores whose only
option is to purchase through the wholesale traders in cities and urban areas. Across the
supply chain, there is no transparency of prices or control over the process. Power is
obviously in the hands of these middle-men and traders and as long as the status quo is
maintained, farmers and consumers will continue to be exploited. Organizing retail,
combined with reforms in agriculture procurement, development of cold-chains and
other infrastructure will benefit the producers and consumers overall. It will help
develop the related and supporting small and medium scale industries in food
processing, crafts, packaging, research and other manufacturing, creating many jobs
which can absorb people displaced from unorganized retailing. Such development has
the potential to provide more sustained productivity enhancements to the economy and
provide the foundation for broad based economic development. To me, it is remains
ironical that a country trying to reduce poverty and improve the livelihoods of its people,
is also arguing to protect such forced employment, i.e. mom-and-pop stores.
Irrespective of whether we allow foreign players in this market, any argument to not
organize the retail sector sounds like an excuse to maintain the political power of
middle-men and thereby allow the poor to remain poor. In Chapter 2, 1 review these
issues in more detail, i.e. the skewed economic development in India and the issues of
human capital formation. I also highlight the retail industry landscape in India and outline
the debate surrounding the issues of whether or not to organize retail in India. These
arguments indicate there are benefits to organizing retail in India, irrespective of whether
India allowsforeign participation in this industry.
Should foreign players be allowed in organized retail in India? On the
question of whether to allow foreign players, we need to review three perspectives, (i)
Can we do this ourselves? (ii) What can we learn from the experience of other countries;
and (iii) What can we learn from our history of managing foreign direct investment in the
country? First, if the domestic industry had been more proactive and the government
had invested in infrastructure development, i.e. roads, financing, cold-chains etc and
market based reforms in agriculture we, perhaps, would not have been asking this
question. Unfortunately, infrastructure development has lagged and the domestic
private sector has been found wanting in their willingness and ability to invest and
organize this market. In the absence of local vigor in the industry, it becomes imperative
to introduce foreign investment to introduce competition and development in the
market. Second, in terms of learning from other countries, it is clear that large format
retailers will cause market displacement, i.e. the mom-and-shop stores will be impacted.
This effect is clearly documented in economic literature and Wal-Mart has for years been
the chief corporate villain who has led this approach. It has been severely criticized in
US domestic and international press as the harbinger of woes to local communities by
keeping prices low and causing local retailers to close down, while suppressing profits of
its suppliers by demanding lower and lower prices, thus squeezing out margins. Despite
this criticism, it cannot be ignored that Wal-Mart has brought many benefits. Its
innovations in supply chain are emulated by large format retailers around the world and
its impact on keeping inflation low is either not understood or underestimated. Charles
Fishman in his book "The Wal-Mart Effect" quotes a study by MIT Professor Jerry
Hausman which finds that the Consumer Price Index calculated by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics in the U.S., is too high by about 0.32 to 0.42 percentage points, which leads to
an upward bias in estimated inflation by 15% (Hausman, 2004). The sheer size, sale and
capacity of Wal-Mart to dictate prices through the supply chain give it an unmatched
power in the market. In India, the introduction of such large format foreign retailers will
also displace the middle-men, i.e. traders, who will find them-selves being crowded out
of their monopsony. The fact that 66% of domestic responses to the DIPP survey are
from traders and that the majority of them strongly oppose opening to foreign retailers,
is a clear indication that the trading community clearly understands this risk. As
previously, the displacement of mom-and-pop stores is also certain, although the impact
may be moderated by requiring Wal-Mart to comply with zoning restrictions, minimum
retailing format and store sizes and provide a wholesale window for the mom-and-pop
stores. FDI in this area can also develop the supporting small and medium enterprises
for food processing, manufacturing and exports. This balance in liberalizing FDI and
ensuring development of domestic business is absolutely essential and the Government
of India, through its various institutions will need to proactively manage the deployment
of such FDI in the country. The good news is that India has tremendous experience in
managing foreign direct investment in a manner that does not compromise national
interest. There is ample evidence through large success stories like Maruti Suzuki,
Unilever and ITC/BAT (British American Tobacco). If the Government can bring
together the will to take a decision, the government can also tap into the knowledge of
its people and systems which have successfully managed such large transitions. India is
clearly not without experience, yet it clearly is lacking in the will to take a decision. In
Chapter 3, 1 discuss the Wal-Mart effect and what it means for India. I also demonstrate
through various examples a proven mechanism for managing foreign direct investment,
adopted by India, in a manner that protects the national interest and which is also in
concert with the private sector motives of revenue growth and profitability. I argue that
this is not a zero-sum game, and that economic development and private sector growth
through managed FDI, can indeed be a reality.
What is the view of the people? To understand what the people of India and
other commentators from outside India are saying, I have analyzed all the opinions that
the Government of India has received in response to the Discussion Paper floated by the
Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (DIPP). In summary, the representation
of various people is highly skewed to responses from traders from the State of Tamil
Nadu, constituting 42 per cent of the total responses across India. Within this number,
85 percent have the same one page letter, on different letterheads, expressing shock at
the Government's intention of opening FDI in multi-brand retail and extolling the
negative impact on small retailers. Including traders from other States in India, the total
representation of traders to all other people is 52 per cent of the responses received. I
conclude that the responses received are not representative enough to make a policy
decision which will impact the whole country. They do however offer a strong data
point which demonstrates the worries and influence of this community. Any decision
that the Government takes, will have to provide for a solution which will appease this
community while also ensuring broad based reform which takes into account the
various structural, political and cultural issues. Chapter 4 presents and analyzes these
pressures on the Government through various constituents. I follow this with an analysis of
the structural, political and cultural issues using a three-lens model and provide a
hypothesis on what India should do in Chapter 5. I argue that organizing its markets to
enhance productivity and meet the growing needs of an increasing middle class, is an
imperative and not an option anymore for India.
Finally, post building my hypothesis in Chapter 5, I respond to the questions
posed by the DIPP on whether India should open FDI in multi-brand retail and if so, how
it should go about doing so. I posit that despite the worries of market displacement of
small retailers and traders, the Government and Industry has adequate time and
experience to manage this change in an effective manner. I also discuss the potential
international trade negotiation benefits that India could leverage on a bilateral basis
with the United States and thereby strengthen its position in global trade, resulting in
sustained productivity improvements and growth for India. Therefore, I recommend
that India should definitely open FDI in multi-brand retail.
In summary, I offer that these decisions are difficult but an absolute necessity.
India's strength is its population of young workers and it must provide the growth
opportunities that its youth aspire to. India is not without experience, yet it must muster
the political will to implement necessary economic reforms. Any political party will only
ignore these decisions at their peril.
_x
CHAPTER 2: Should Retail Be Organized In India
2.1. Understanding India's Growth Story
In this section, I review India's growth story and attempt to add, at the risk
of being pessimistic, a hint of realism to the issuesfacing India. I posit that the most
important factor in understanding the debate on FDI in multi-brand retail is to
understand India's growth story and its many challenges in managing this growth
to keep the dialogue in perspective.
2.1.1.Economic development
On the eve of the Industrial revolution (1770), India was the second
largest economy in the world, contributing more than 20% of the total world
output. By the 1970's, that share was 3%. Post-Independence, India's annual
growth rate stagnated at 3.5% from 1950 to 1980's and growth in per capita
income was only 1.3% (Yi, 2007). This abysmal growth led to the coining of the
controversial term, the Hindu Growth Rate, coined by the famous Indian
economist Raj Krishna (Tripathi, 2006)
As Arvind Subramanian from the Peterson Institute for International
Economics and Center for Global Development, Washington D.C., puts it, "luckily
for India, the Hindu growth rate was not eternal (Subramanian, 2008)." Arvind
also argues that departure from this unremarkable growth happened in the
1980's and not in 1991 as is the conventional wisdom associated with opening of
the Indian economy after the 1991 balance of payments (BOP) crisis1 . In terms of
the approach to economic growth, India followed an unconventional model,
either by chance or by design and is characterized by:
- 1960 & 1970's: Inefficient import substitution system which erected barriers
for foreign competition but also throttled domestic business by imposing taxes,
industrial licenses and reservations for public and small scale sectors
More about the balance of payments crisis may be read by accessing the following IMF report on imf.org:
"What caused the 1991 Currency Crisis in India; IMF staff paper 49, Vol 3"
- 1980's: The government took a pro-business approach, i.e. they eased the
distortion by rectifying the licensing regime and allowing incumbents and
existing business to benefit. Since 1980, India's economic growth rate has
more than doubled, rising from 1.7 per cent (in per capita terms) in 1950-80 to
3.8 per cent in 1980-2000. Arvind calls this period, the true era of import
substitution for India.
- Post 1991: Following the Balance of Payments (BOP) crisis, India opened its
economy and adopted a pro-market stance by allowing foreign entrants and
opening up competition.
A result of these developments has been that the Indian economy has
grown at an impressive 6.6 per cent over the last two decades, spanning 1988/89
- 2008/09. In the six years before the global financial crisis of 2008, the economy
was growing at 8.5 percent. While the financial crisis put back the GDP growth by
2-3 per cent, the latest Economic Survey issued by the Government of India,
indicates that the Indian economy has recovered rapidly (Government of India,
2011). Growth in 2009-10 is estimated to have rebounded to 8.0 per cent as per
the Quick estimates released on 31 January 2011 and 8.6 per cent as per the
Advance estimate released by the Central Statistical Institute (CSO) on 7 February
2011.
These developments notwithstanding, there is a now, a new debate
regarding the sustainability of this growth rate. The major issues facing the
economy relate to the uneven distribution of this growth and what is now being
called, a governance deficit which highlights the issues of managing a large
economy in the face of a growing middle class, changing aspirations, a stronger
oligarchy of domestic business and a corrupt polity and business environment.
2.1.2. Disparities by Sector and Region
At a macro level, there are two key issues that must be understood. First,
while the economy is growing at 8 percent or more for the last decade, the
majority of this growth is led by tremendous contributions from the services
sector, led by IT and IT enabled services. Second, the growth is highly disparate
within the country and is concentrated in richer states, leaving the poorer states
far behind.
DISPARITY IN GROWTH BY SECTOR - SERVICE LED GROWTH
India's economic growth has been predominantly driven by the expansion
in services, over other parts of the economy. It is argued that India may skip the
intermediate steps of manufacturing led growth in the economic productivity
ladder and transform its economy in a sustainable manner through the service
led growth. Table 1, adopted from article in Business Standard 2010 (Singh,
2010) below shows the trend in growth by sector.
Table 1: Sectoral Percentage Shares of GDP
Year Agriculture and Industry Services
allied activities
1950-51 55.28 10.65 34.07
1955-56 53.36 11.8 34.84
1960-61 50.81 13.18 36.01
1965-66 43.16 16.01 40.83
1970-71 44.31 15.46 40.23
1975-76 42.37 16.05 41.57
1980-81 37.92 17.45 44.63
1985-86 34.96 18.53 46.52
1990-91 31.37 19.8 48.83
1995-96 27.34 21.24 51.43
2000-01 23.89 19.99 56.12
2005-06 19.54 19.36 61.1
2006-07 18.51 19.53 61.96
2007-08 17.8 19.24 62.96
2008-09 16.95 18.5 64.55
Source: Nirvirkar Singh, Understanding India's Service Led Growth
Nearly 65 per cent of the GDP now comes from Services. Interestingly between
1980-81 and 2008-09, the combined contribution of agriculture and services to
the GDP has remained nearly constant, i.e. 81 percent in 1980-81 and 82 per
cent in 2008-09. Industry has remained nearly flat, i.e. growing to 18.5 per cent
from 17.5 per cent previously. Agriculture's contribution to GDP has fallen from
38 per cent in 1980 to 24 per cent in 2000, a drop of 20%, while the
employment in agriculture dropped from 68 per cent to 59 per cent, a drop of 9
per cent, which implies more uneven growth in the rural areas. At the same
time, the 20 per cent drop in agricultures contribution has been taken up by
Services, which grew from 45 per cent in 1980 to 56 per cent 2000, whereas
employment grew from 18 percent in services in 1980 to 22 per cent in 2000. It
is obvious that the high skilled jobs in Services create higher margins and
contribution to the GDP but with lesser employment. It is also clear that many
of the rural youth today do not have the skills needed to enter the highly skilled
job market that the Services sector provides. Figures 1 and 2 below provide a
visual description of the enormity of the situation.
Figure 1: Service Sector GDP contribution
GDP Contribution by sectorL Agriculture * Industry X Services
Data source: ICRIER - Impact of Organized retailing
on unorganized sector, 2008
Figure 2: Employment in Service Sector
Employment by sector
M Agriculture * Industry I Services
Data source: ICRIER - Impact of Organized retailing
on unorganized sector, 2008
DISPARITY IN GROWTH BY REGION - FORWARD AND
BACKWARD STATES
Despite India's strong growth performance, the other growing concern is
that the benefits of growth have been concentrated in India's richer states,
leaving the poorer states lagging further and further behind (Purfield, 2006).
These concerns become more serious when one considers the projections
suggesting that 60 per cent of the 620 million increase in India's population, by
2051, will occur in three of its poorest States: Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar
Pradesh (Visaria, 2003).
In a paper titled Regional Disparities in India, NJ Kurian argues that the
seriousness of emerging regional imbalances have not yet received the public
attention it deserves. Fifteen2 major states account for 95.5 per cent of the
population, while the rest of India account for the remaining 4.5 per cent of the
population. Kurian breaks these fifteen states into two groups, Forward group
and Backward group. Geographically, these forward States, namely Andhra
Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Kerala, Maharashtra, Punjab and Tamil
Nadu fall in the western and southern parts of the country. The backward group
comprises of Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh
and West Bengal, and these States fall in the northern and eastern part of the
country and they are geographically contiguous (Kurian, 2005).
In addition to demographics, the differences between the forward and
backward groups extend to literacy, income, investment and central assistance.
Against India's literacy rate of 65.4 percent, as per the 2001 Census in India,
Kurian highlights that all States in the forward group, except Andhra Pradesh 3,
have literacy rates above the national average and vary from 90.9 per cent in
Kerala to 67.0 per cent in Karnataka. In the backward group, all except West
Bengal have literacy rates below national average. They vary from 64.3 per cent
in Assam to as low as 47.5 in Bihar. The level of literacy in West Bengal is 69.2
per cent. And while poverty has declined, as shown in Table 2, the share of
incomes varies greatly between the forward and backward group States as
shown in Table 3. Poverty in the backward group now contributes to 70 per
2 With the recent reorganization of the States, there are a total of 28 States, besides 7 Union Territories in the
Indian Union now. In the absence of the relevant data, for the purpose of the present study, we consider the
undivided States of Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh.
3 Literacy level of Andhra Pradhesh as per the 2001 Census was 61.1 per cent
cent of the poor in India as shown in Table 4. It is also interesting to note that
post the economic reforms in 1991, all the forward group States have improved
their income, except for Haryana and Punjab; while the entire backward group
States, except Rajasthan, have further deteriorated.
Table 2: Decline of poverty in India
Source: N.J. Kurian: Regional Disparities in India (Kurian, 2005)
Table 3: Per capita Gross State Domestic Product as a percentage of GDP
States 1981-82 1985-86 1990-91 1997-98
Forward group
Andhra Pradesh 87.4 82.4 92.5 92.9
Gujarat 125.3 124.4 118.8 137.4
Haryana 146.5 139.9 146.6 139.4
Karnataka 92.8 93.7 95.4 107.2
Kerala 90.5 90.9 87.8 116.4
Maharashtra 143.0 134.7 144.7 167.5
Punjab 168.6 165.0 169.7 146.5
Tamil Nadu 92.8 97.0 100.0 119.5
Backward group
Assam 83.6 92.1 83.1 62.2
Bihar 58.8 60.6 53.5 44.2
Madhya Pradesh 80.8 74.8 78.1 73.5
Orissa 75.0 74.7 66.9 61.8
Rajasthan 76.6 74.0 79.3 81.1
Uttar Pradesh 75.8 71.9 70.6 64.4
West Bengal 103.3 102.9 91.7 85.1
All India 100 100 100 100
Source: Soumitra Chaudhuri : Table 2 in Economic Growth in the States - Four
Decades - 1; Money and Finance, Vol.2, Number 4, Oct-Dec., 2000; (Kurian,
2005)
Table 4: Percentage share of poor within the forward & backward groups
States 1983-84 1987-88 1993-94 1999-2000
Forward
Group
Andhra 5.10 5.22 4.81 4.57
Pradesh
Gujarat 3.65 3.98 3.28 2.61
Haryana 0.92 0.83 1.37 0.67
Karnataka 4.64 5.17 4.88 4.01
Kerala 3.31 2.88 2.39 1.58
Maharashtra 9.01 9.65 9.53 8.76
Punjab 0.89 0.82 0.78 0.56
Tamil Nadu 8.05 7.53 6.31 5.01
Total for
forward 35.57 36.08 33.35 27.77
States
Backward
Group
Assam 2.41 2.47 3.01 3.63
Bihar 14.31 13.71 15.40 16.36
Madhya 8.61 8.61 9.32 11.47
Pradesh
Orissa 5.62 5.40 5.01 6.50
Rajasthan 3.93 4.65 4.01 3.14
Uttar 17.24 17.47 18.87 20.36
Pradesh
West Bengal 9.87 9.24 7.95 8.20
Total for
Backward 61.99 61.55 63.57 69.66
States
All India 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Planning Commission Data (Kurian, 2005)
2.1.3. India's oligarch's
As India's businesses grow, power is concentrating in the hands of a few.
James Lamont and James Fontanella-Khan, in an article in the Financial Times
highlight that the ability of big business to influence policy now is greater than it
was prior to the 1991 reforms (Fontanella-Khan, 2011). An Asian Development
Bank report cited in the same article suggests that the 50 billionaires in the
country account for 20 per cent of India's GDP and 80 per cent of stock market
capitalization. In the article, they compare India to Russia and draw a
comparison to Joseph Stiglitz's Globalization and its Discontents which focuses
on how Russia mismanaged its transition from communism to free markets.
In reviewing India's history of economic liberalization from Arvind
Subramanian's lens', it is easy to understand where this concentration of power
comes from. Circa the 1980s when the Indian government started lifting the
self-imposed restrictions on industry, only a few domestic players were able
and ready to capitalize on the opportunity. The major family held businesses,
including the Tata's, Birla's, Bajaj families along with Reliance, Mahindra's,
Godrej and newcomers including Anil Agarwal of Vedanta, Sunil Mittal of Bharti
Airtel and Munjal's of Hero Honda, have continued to strengthen their
businesses. The poster child among this has been the entrepreneurial growth
story of the IT and IT Enabled sector, along with strong growth in
telecommunications.
It is the same large family businesses who are now opening large retail
stores in India, with the exception of a new runaway success with the Future
Group, who own the Pantaloon brand and began as a solo men's-wear, single
store. Pantaloon has pioneered the hypermarket format in India and attracted
other large players, including Tata, Reliance, and Goenka's. Not all are
successful. Bharti Airtel has tied up with Wal-Mart, and other large domestic
players are either beginning to partner with international retailers or wait,
while simultaneously lobbying with the Government of India to open the retail
sector to foreign direct investments. The lack of infrastructure, i.e. roads, ports
and absence of effective cold-storage and warehousing across the country make
retailing, especially in the food sector, very capital intensive and while the
efficacy of the Government's current procurement and distribution system can
be debated, it is not something that the large domestic businesses have felt
inclined to invest in, without express support from the government. In support
of this argument, one needs to only look at the fact that though FDI in cold chain
is permitted up to 100 per cent, the FDI inflow have been negligent and the
domestic players have not stepped up either (DIPP, 2010).
2.1.4. Employment, Middle Class and changing Politics
EMPLOYMENT
In 2006, a year of 9.6% GDP growth - India produced 1 million fewer jobs
than in 1993, when the economy was just starting to grow (Khilnani, The
paradox of India's new prosperity, 2010). In the Government of India's first
annual report on employment, titled 'Report to the People' released in July
2010, the employment statistics show that employment growth in the period
1993-94 to 2004-05 grew at 1.87% per annum against 2.06% in the preceding
period of 1983 to 1993-94. Employment estimates using of two different
approaches 4 to calculating employment are shown in Figure 3 from the period
1983 through 2004-05 (Employment, 2010). Another report, on Skills
Formation and Employment Assurance in the Unorganized Sector, by the
Government of India, prepared by the National Commission for Enterprises in
the Unorganised Sector (NCEUS) states that informal or unorganized workers
constituted an overwhelming 86 per cent of total workers in 2004-05 and that
between1999-2000 and 2004-05, what increased in India was the informal
employment, both in the organized as well as the unorganized sectors. The
report also highlights that three-fifth of this workforce is self employed (NCEUS,
2009). The Commission highlights that with rapid growth in the economy, India
is seeing broad based shortage of skilled manpower to meet the workforce
needs and refers to an estimate by an October 2004, CII-McKinseys report
stating that India needs 20 million increase in skilled manpower by 2015,
requiring an incremental skilling of 1.5 million people (from 2005) every year.
The lack of skills and education result in denial of access to regular employment
resulting in a situation where only 4 percent of the illiterate workforce has
access to regular employment. Forty per cent of the remaining illiterate
workforce is employed as casual labor and the remaining are self-employed.
4 The Indian labor market is characterized by complex situations which arise due to full-time and part-time
workers, variations in availability of work during different seasons of a year, workers engaging in multiple jobs,
workers ready to work at low wages and other social and cultural factors (Employment, 2010)
s ,Made in India: the next big manufacturing export story', a joint report by Confederation of Indian industries
and McKinsey (CII-McKinsey) in October 2004
Figure 3: Employment (in millions) by UPSS6 and CDS method 7
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The lack of regular employment is also linked with the backwardness of States.
In general, poorer states such as Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and
Uttar Pradesh have a high proportion of workers engaged in casual work and
very low proportion of regular employment. In contrast, developed states like
Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Punjab and Delhi have a high proportion of regular
employment (Table 5). This report (Employment, 2010) further supports the
issue of the growing disparities of growth in India, as highlighted in Section
2.1.2 earlier in this paper.
6 UPSS - Usual Principal and Subsidiary Status relates to the activity status of a person during the reference
period of last 365 days preceding the date of survey. The activity status on which a person spent relatively
longer time (major time criterion) is considered the Usual Principal Status
CDS - Current Daily Status of a person is determined on the basis of his/her activity status on each day of the
reference week using a priority-cum-major time criterion (day to day labor time disposition). Broadly, a person
is considered working (employed) for the full day if he/she worked for 4 hours of more during the day
Table 5: Classification of States according to % of Regular Employment
Percentage of Regular Employment to Total Employment
Very low, less Low, 10 to 15% Medium, 15% to High, 20% and
than 10% 20% above
Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Jammu and Maharashtra,
Chhattisgarh, Pradesh, Assam, Andhra Kashmir, Tamil Nadu,
Jharkhand, Pradesh, Karnataka, Gujarat, Kerala, Punjab, Delhi
Orissa, Uttar Uttaranchal, Himachal Haryana
Pradesh Pradesh, West Bengal
Source: NSSO Survey, 2004-05
MIDDLE CLASS AND CHANGING POLITICS
With forecasts for India's real GDP growth over the next two decades
ranging between 6 and 9 per cent, McKinsey Global Institute predicts that
India's incomes levels will triple, if this growth is sustained for a period of 20
years (McKinsey, The 'Bird of Gold': The Rise of India's Consumer Market,
2007). In their report titled, "The Bird of Gold: The Rise of India's Consumer
Market", McKinsey projects that by 2025, rising incomes will lift 291 million out
of poverty and create a 583 million, strong middle class.
The impact of the emergence of a strong middle class and its impact on the
politics in India can be best understood by first examining the dependence of
the poor and backward states on its political leaders. Raghuram Rajan 8 , in his
speech to the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, on September 10th, 2008, argued
that the people on backward states 'tolerate' the corrupt politician simply
because he is the crutch that helps the poor navigate a bureaucratic system that
gives them little or no access (Rajan, 2008). As the India's middle-class grows,
there is hope that the politics will change as people will demand more
transparency and will have lesser tolerance or need for a local politician to help
them navigate and therefore extract rents from the common man.
While a solution in the rise of the middle class to India's many problems in
managing its growth, politics and corruption may seem simplistic, the current
waves of outburst and action against a Minister of State and the summoning of
Raghurarn Rajan is Professor of Finance, Booth School of Business, University of Chicago
India's billionaires, in the recent telecom scandal, itself mark a sea of change in
India's society and politics (Reuters, 2011).
2.2. The Retail Debate
MARKET SIZE AND STRUCTURE
AT Kearney's Global Retail Development Index (GRDI) 2010, in a survey of
60 global retail executives, representing all sectors, sizes and geographies, shows
that Brazil, Russia, India and China remain the top priority for retail expansion.
Nearly 80 per cent of the executives named one of these countries as part of their
firm's plans for short-term international growth (ATKearney, 2010). India has
been on leading the GRDI index from 2005 to 2007 and then again in 2009. In
2010, India slipped to number 3 on the GRDI list. Despite this dip, India remains
a very attractive market for retail (Figure 4) in AT Kearney's analysis.
Figure 4: AT Kearney 2010 GRDI Country Attractiveness
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As per the projections of the Indian Council for Research in International
Economic Relations (ICRIER), the retail business is expected to grow at 13 per
cent annually from US$ 322 billion in 2006-07 to US$ 590 billion in 2011-12
(ICRIER, Multibrand Retail, 2008). The AT Kearney GRDI report of 2010
estimates the market at US$ 410 billion and on track to grow rapidly to US$ 535
billion by 2013. While these numbers are a bit lower that ICRIER's projections
made in 2008 before the global financial crisis, it seems that India has recovered
fast and well from the shock to end up close to the earlier projections. This in
itself is impressive. The retail market is divided into the unorganized and
organized sectors, where the organized sector contributed only 4 per cent in
2006-07 and was expected to grow at a CAGR of 45-50 per cent to reach 16 per
cent by 2011 - 12 (Figure 5). As of the AT Kearney 2010 GRDI report, organized
retail was still at 5 per cent and had not achieved the growth rates anticipated.
Figure 5: Projected growth of Organized Retail
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Source: (ICRIER, Multibrand Retail, 2008)
Compared internationally, the Indian retail market remains the least
developed among the emerging Asian and economies and its BRIC counterparts
(Table 6). Retail trade in India continues to be labor intensive and employs more
than 18 million people which translates to nearly 8 per cent of the workforce of
459 million people (refer Figure 3), across 10.69 million enterprise of which 49
per cent were in the rural areas.
Table 6: Share of organized and unorganized sectors (BRIC and Asian countries)
Countries Organized (%) Unorganized (%)
India 4 96
China 20 80
South Korea 15 85
Indonesia 30 75
Philippines 35 65
Thailand 40 60
Malaysia 55 50
Brazil 36 64
Russia 33 67
Source: Planet Retail and Technopak Advisers Pvt Ltd (ICRIER, Multibrand Retail, 2008)
REGULATION AND THE DEBATE ON FDI IN MULTI-BRAND RETAIL
The current policy9 of the Government of India places the following
restrictions on foreign equity participation in the retail sector10:
* FDI in multi-brand retailing is prohibited
* FDI in single-brand retailing was permitted in 2006, to the extent of 51%, by
approval route. As of May 2010, the Government had received 94 proposals
of which 57 have been approved11 , attracting an inflow of US$ 194.69 million
between April, 2006 and March, 2010. Under this policy, products to be sold
must be of a single brand and must be sold under the same brand
internationally. Approvals must be sought from the Foreign Investment
Promotion Board (FIPB) and Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion
(DIPP). Additions to product categories to be sold under 'single brand'
require fresh government approval.
* FDI in cash and carry wholesale trading was allowed in 1997, to the extent of
100% under the approval route. In 2006, it was brought under the automatic
route. Between April, 2000 and March, 2010, FDI inflows of US$ 1.779 billion
9 Source: DIPP released discussion paper on FDI in multi-brand retail (DIPP, 2010)
10 FDI is governed by the Foreign Direct Investment Policy of the Government of India and the Foreign Exchange
Management Act, 1999. Foreign investment is permitted in virtually all activities without government approval,
except for a few strategic sectors. FDI policy is framed by the Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion
(DIPP), the Ministry of Commerce & Industry and the Government of India.
1 Proposals received and approved relate to retail trading of sportswear, luxury goods, apparel, fashion
clothing, jewelry, hand-bags, life-style products etc.
were received in this sector, amounting to 1.54 per cent of total FDl inflows
during the same period.
In addition, the Government allows 100% foreign investment in the cold-
chain infrastructure but this sector has not seen significant FDI inflows.
Post the financial crisis of 2008, this debate has caught the attention of
global media and politics. The debate on this issue however, goes back to the
1991 period when the government started opening the economy in an effort to
salvage the balance of payments crisis of 1991 (refer section 2.1 - Economic
Development). In 1993, the government opened foreign participation in retail,
but no foreign players were approved. Three years later, the restriction was
reemployed. The heart of the opposition has been the economic reforms and
improvements in the retail supply chain versus small shopkeepers and unions
who fear being crushed by the international retailers (Fels, 2007). Proponents of
improved productivity and efficiency of the retail sector through FDI (ICRIER,
Conference page, 2005) argue:
" Better realizations for producers through integration of supply chain and
sourcing capabilities with retailers
* Improved products, price, quality and service for consumers
* Link local suppliers, farmers, manufacturers to global markets
* Improved tax income for the Government which can be ploughed back
Opponents to FDI argue that the displacement of jobs due to organized
retail will be disastrous, as the economy despite growing at an average of 6.6 per
cent has not added enough jobs in the past decade, calling it the period of 'jobless
growth' (refer section 2.4 on employment). Their arguments highlight:
" The high degree of unorganized retail is a derivative of the lack of adequate
employment in the rural and urban sector. This is also a direct offshoot of the
lack of vocational training and skills in the youth of India, which can be readily
employed (refer section 2.4 on employment)
* In addition, the manufacturing sector has not picked up growth and yet does
not offer opportunities for employing lesser skilled people. As a result, the
agriculture sector is overcrowded, and the high-end services, technology and
manufacturing sectors face a shortage of skills
* The difference between the growth of modern retail in developed and
developing nations is marked by the 'extreme speed of transformation'
(ICRIER, Multibrand Retail, 2008).
* Opponents fear that the rate of displacement of people from retail will far
outweigh the pace at which jobs can be provided to these people
(Guruswamy, 2005).
In summary, a question that many of the opponents are asking echoes a
comment by Guruswamy, Sharma, Mohanty and Korah in their report "FDI in India's
Retail Sector - More Bad than Good" where they ask why FDI is needed when India
has a vibrant domestic sector. They base their views on the fact the Food retail is a
very large sector of the retail market, accounting for 63 per cent of retail sales. This
sector alone has the opportunity to generate employment and cascading
enhancements and economic activity in the rural sector. Unfortunately while this
argument plays very well to the autarky sentiment in the Indian public, the domestic
sector has not invested in improving the infrastructure or supply chain in India.
Many domestic retail chains like Subhiksha and Magnet have actually folded up or
exited the market during the economic downturn while others have focused on
optimizing their operations (ATKearney, 2010).
2.3. Section review
This section highlights the following key messages:
" India's pattern of development is unconventional. It has chosen democracy
before growth, unlike the experience in East Asia, and its growth is being
driven by skilled labor, in services, high technology and manufacturing which
bypasses the traditional method of development from agrarian to textiles and
other low-skilled manufacturing to more complex manufacturing and then
services and high technology, pharmaceuticals and aerospace etc.
" India is a gradualist. Dr. Montek Singh Ahluwalia, the Deputy Chairman of the
Planning Commission, in his speech at MIT acknowledged that
implementation of development policies take time in India and that India
could be more efficient. He however eluded that by mandating continuous
consultation and participation, India creates a firm foundation for inclusive
growth and social peace (Ahluwalia, 2009).
" India has many reasons to feel confident about its future. But Raghuram
Rajan warns that such confidence should not lead to hubris and complacency.
There are real issues that need to be addressed and the resolution starts with
getting the Indian domestic corporations and public officials to become more
transparent and efficient.
" Gurcharan Das 12 in his address at WIPRO13 summarizes the potential of
India's growth, changing politics and the development divide in a simple
picture (Figure 6). The middle-class is growing, and with it, the consumption
patterns, education and the markets of India are changing. While regional
disparities in growth exist, the country is unified in its aspiration for
equanimity of opportunity and growth.
Figure 6: Changing India
The growing middle class
will change India's politics.
This change will be 20 years
behind for states east of the
Kanpur Chennai line
- Gurcharan Das (2009)
Source: Gurcharan Das - presentation at
Wipro, 2009
* Organizing the Retail Industry provides a huge opportunity for India, its
people and also for the private sector to grow. India can choose to keep it
protected and underdeveloped, or organize through domestic and foreign
private players.
Gurcharan Das is former CEO of Procter & Gamble India and later MD, P&G Worldwide (Strategic Planning)
13 Wipro is an Indian Information Technology company. See www.wipro.com
* Opposition to Organizing Retail seems to center around keeping foreign
players out. Opponents to do not object to domestic firms setting up
organized retail chains. Only a few respondents to the DIPP discussion paper
make reference to a joint Parliamentary Committee report which
recommends that multi-brand retail should also be banned for domestic
players.
The rational for opposition has been fear of the negative impact to
unorganized small retailers. Ironically the outcome to the mum-and-pop stores
would potentially be the same, whether the organizing of the market is done
through FDI or domestic players. In summary, it seems that the debate on multi-
brand retail is no more about whether retail should be organized or not, but
rather about whether foreign players should be allowed access. Or at least, the
debate has now moved to this context.
_ X
CHAPTER 3 - Should Foreign Players Be Allowed
in India's Retail Market
Despite the rhetoric of opposition to opening of FDI in multi-brand retail, it is
illuminating to note that the opposition is perhaps not so much about the impact to
mom-and-pop stores, but more about ensuring that India does not concede economic
control in this process. This fear is clearly seen in the comments received by the
Government of India, in response to its attempt to seek public opinion (DIPP, 2010).
This section attempts to understand what India should expectfrom FDI by largeformat
multi-brand retailers. I illustrate this by using Wal-Mart as an example and posit that
such large retailers will cause market displacement and India's fears are not
unfounded. On the other hand, I also highlight what such multinational companiesfear
when they invest in India. India and Indian companies are not without power. I
conclude this chapter by illustrating successful examples of multinationals working
with the private sector in India and aligning their profit motive to the national interest
of the country.
3.1. Understanding Wal-Mart & the Wal-Mart Effect for India
There is a world of literature available on Wal-Mart, its supply chain,
sustainability strategies and impact on communities. As much as there is
information on Wal-Mart, there is also debate and opposition to Wal-Mart and the
negative impacts of Wal-Mart.
Wal-Mart, is the world's largest retailer with revenues of US$405 billion
for fiscal 201014, free cash flows of US$14billion, operating more than 8,400
stores including 4,304 stores in the United States and another 4,112 across 15
countries. In 2007, it earned more than the economies of 144 countries (Riper,
2007). It operates in a very low margin, high turnover business (Table 8) and is
by far the most efficient at managing its inventory and costs. Wal-Mart (for
effect) earns revenue of more than US1 billion a day, is Fortune 1 on the Fortune
500, employs more than 2 million associates15, serve over 200 million customers
each week and its revenues compared to the GDP of countries would place Wal-
Mart as the 26th largest economy in the world (Council, 2010).
14 Wal-Mart Annual Report 2010
15 Wal-Mart employees are called associates
The very scale and size of Wal-Mart is jaw-dropping and depending on
how it impacts a person, it can be awe inspiring or very scary. When Wal-Mart
enters a country, it invites promise for improving the incomes for many while
also instilling a fear of displacement of jobs and an adverse impact to the
communities. I am writing this chapter to highlight the nature of Wal-Mart's
business, as also being prescriptive of what other large retailers (domestic or
international) attempt to emulate, either successfully or not, and to understand
what this means for us. I understand that this may be oversimplification and not
representative of some retailers. I posit that the exceptions are few.
NATURE OF RETAILING
One of the first things to understand is that retailing is a tough, low
margin, high turn business. Success depends on how profitable a company can be
in its operations. Table 7 provides a glimpse of the comparative net margins
across companies and industries 16. It is evident that even within the low margin
business of large retail Wal-Mart is able to extract twice the net profit margin
compared to other large retailers. And, it is manages to do this year after year,
consistently.
What is the secret of Wal-Mart's success? Edna Bonacich and Jake Wilson
in their paper in titled "Global Production and Distribution: Wal-Mart's Global
Logistics Empire" highlight that their success is linked to the corporate
philosophy of Every Day Low Prices (EDLP). EDLP targets to minimize margins
and maximize profits by three categories, internal processes, relational process
and external processes. The description of internal and external processes focus
on dynamics of abstemious management practices, keeping wages low and a
fierce anti-unionism, coupled with the use of Wal-Mart's considerable power to
pressure governments for various favorable policies and advantages. An example
of Wal-Mart's influence is the construction of a Wal-Mart store, despite protests,
in Mexico by leasing property on Perimeter C of the Teotihuacan archaeological
site, popularly known as the Temple of the Sun, and which has been granted the
prestigious UNESCO recognition as a World Heritage Site (Margath A. Walker,
2006).
16 US based businesses. Data compiled from ValueLine.com
Table 7: Net margin comparables
Industry Company 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Retail (large) Wal-Mart 3.5% 3.4% 3.4% 3.5% 3.5%
Kroeger 1.5% 1.6% 1.7% 1.7% 1.6%
CostCo 1.6% 1.8% 1.9% 1.8%% 1.9%
Retail (mid) Macy's 2.5% 2.2% 3.7% 4.3% 5.0%
GAP 7.8% 6.7% 5.5% 4.9% 6.9%
Starbucks 6.1% 5.1% 7.1% 7.5% 7.8%
Retail (online) Amazon 3.7% 3.1% 3.2% 1.8% 4.0%
Ebay 15.3% 20.8% 21.3% 18.9% 23.8%
Consumer P&G 14.3% 14.5% 13.5% 12.7% 12.2%
Products
Coca Cola 22.4% 22.1% 20.7% 23.1% 22.5%
Pharma Pfizer 17.2% 16.6% 31.5% 31.0% 29.2%
Bio-tech Amgen 33.7% 28.0% 25.5% 29.3% 29.8%
Healthcare United 4.4% 4.5% 6.2% 5.8% 7.3%
Health
Manufacturing Dow 1.4% 2.9% 6.8% 8.4% 9.2%
Chemicals
Oil & Gas Exxon 8.9% 7.0% 10.6% 11.3% 11.7%
Technology Intel 12.4% 14.1% 18.2% 14.3% 22.3%
Internet Google 27.6% 24.3% 25.3% 27.7% 24.7%
Source: data compiled from
student account
analysts reports on valueline.com; access through MIT
While Wal-Mart gets a lot of flack in the world for their internal and
external processes, they are seen as clear leaders and innovators in the relational
process of managing its end-to-end supply chain. Boncich and Wilson further
argue in their article that although Wal-Mart has been one of the leaders of the
revolution in logistics' 7 , the forces that have led this shift in managing end-to-end
supply chains are greater than one company alone. Wal-Mart is both, a product of
these changes and a creator of them.
17 Logistics is defined as 'management of the entire supply chain, from purchase of raw materials through sale
of the final product, and back again for replenishment of goods as they are sold (Wilson, 2006)
CORE COMPETENCE
Wal-Mart's innovation has two core competencies. The first core
competence is that their logistics system stands on a set of "distribution centers",
and not warehouses. This is the heart of Wal-Mart's competence. In 1945, after
getting out service, Sam Walton18 moved to Newport, Arkansas and bought a
small, underperforming store which was part of the Butler Brothers franchise19.
Through his experience, Sam Walton learnt that Butler Brothers purchased goods
from more than 7,500 different manufacturers and as much as 25 per cent
remained in stock from one to three years. Walton determined to keep his goods
in motion and in 1970's he financed a series of distribution centers which were
designed not to store, but to quickly repackage ad consolidate them into
truckloads which would move immediately to the nearest store. These
distribution centers set the pattern of growth for Wal-Mart. Till 1978, all new
Wal-Mart stores were built or acquired within a single day's round-trip truck
drive from Bentonville 20 , and the average distance from Bentonville to the stores
was 273 miles (Lichtenstein, 2009).
Figure 7 shows the concentration of Wal-Mart stores across the United
States. Another unique pattern of store development is the very high correlation
to population. The relation between population and Wal-Mart locations is
brought out by a technique called 'buffering' (Graham, 2006). Buffering is a GIS
techniques where a circle in drawn around a point to create a catchment area.
Figures 8 and 9 show the results of buffering by a 20 and 60 mile radius
respectively. Zook and Graham's analysis shows that 60 per cent of the entire US
population lives within 5 miles of a Wal-Mart location and 96 per cent are within
20 miles.
The second core competence that Wal-Mart has is their Point of Sale (POS)
system. Between 1985 and 1987, Wal-Mart invested to build the world's largest
private, integrated satellite communications network, which beamed data, voice,
and video communications to and from corporate headquarters and more than
fifteen hundred stores. By the 1980s, Wal-Mart's low income consumers had
started using credit cards but the lines at the checkout counters were long. The
development of the POS technology was a response to fight against this
18 Founder of Wal-Mart
1 Butler Brothers got into franchise in 1920. By 1947, there were more than twelve hundred franchise stores
under the Ben Franklin name. Store owners were obligated to purchase 80 per cent of their merchandise from
Butler Brothers at a mark-up of 25 per cent for the wholesaler (Lichtenstein, 2009).
20 Headquarters and the place where Wal-Mart built the first 150,000 square foot distribution center
inefficiency (Lichtenstein, 2009). The technology system is Wal-Mart's second
core competence and is its nerve center.
Figure 7: Wal-Mart stores in the US, by retail division
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In addition to the logistics capabilities through distribution center and its
POS technology, Wal-Mart developed a strategic capability in its relationship with
Procter & Gamble. By 1987, Wal-Mart was P&G's third largest domestic
customer, and P&G was Wal-Mart's single biggest vendor. Both companies
realized their synergistic potential and integrated their retail systems to benefit
from a symbiotic relationship best described as a "push" system in logistics. In
the push system, production is dominated by large consumer goods
manufacturers who have long production runs in order to gain efficiencies of
scale and minimize unit costs. The system leads to production of inventory
surpluses which are pushed out to retailers. The manufacturers offer deals and
promotions to motivate retailers to purchase large quantities in advance of
delivery.
LEAN RETAILING
As usage of the POS system, "Retail-Link" grew, Wal-Mart could access
more and more data about consumer preferences and behavior. With more
information, Wal-Mart was in a position to improve sales by getting a clearer
command of what it was actually selling. This led to a revolution in logistics,
where the industry moved from the "push" system described above to the "pull"
system (Wilson, 2006). The pull system characterizes the Just-in-Time (JIT) or
lean retailing concept as following:
* shorter lead times, making it difficult to do mass production
* reduced inventory for all actors
* integrate processes along the entire supply chain, rather than within
organizations
e move from functional excellence to integrated solutions along the whole chain
e Retailers, suppliers, transportation providers ideally form strategic
partnerships, sharing information so that all participants are able to rapidly
respond to shifts in demand.
In summary, Wal-Mart is a master at lean retailing, where lean retailing
causes a shift in power from producers/manufacturers to retailers, and a rise in
retailer power (Wilson, 2006). Some people call this the Wal-Mart Effect.
THE WAL-MART EFFECT
Literature review associated the Wal-Mart effect primarily highlights the
negative impacts on labor and displacement of small retailers resulting in a
negative impact on communities. Discussed below are some key themes that may
constitute the effect or Wal-Mart.
1. Impact on Rural communities:
A 10 year study on the impact of Wal-Mart on rural communities with
population 30,000 - 50,000, in the state of Iowa, points out that towns which
attracted a Wal-Mart had greater than average sales and a geographically broader
customer base, however these same towns saw sales decline to levels lower than
before Wal-Mart, after the first fears of Wal-Mart's entry (Stone, 1997). Stone
shows that while the Wal-Mart towns attracted a sizable increase in sales initially,
the biggest losers were small towns in close proximity, which had significant
sales loss (up to 47 per cent) when a Wal-Mart opened within 20 miles. Stone
concludes with an assessment that state level shopping habits of consumers,
changes from purchasing goods from multiple retailers to buying the majority of
goods from mass merchandisers, over time after the opening of a large mass
merchandiser such as Wal-Mart.
2. Changes in consumer behavior:
The same effect (as above) is cited by Holly R. Barcus, in a paper titled
Wal-Mart-scapes in Rural and Small Town America. Barcus points out that Wal-
Mart provides, even in rural areas, an important pastime through the experience
of "shopping". For the rural consumer, Wal-Mart provides an experience similar
to shopping in an urban shopping mall, where rural youth and college students
"hang-out". While this consumerism conflicts with the stereotypical rural idyllic,
Barcus argues that Wal-Mart changes consumer behavior and the divisive tension
between the idealized rural versus the consumption-oriented lifestyle provides
an important backdrop to understanding the opposition to Wal-Mart when it
comes to small towns.
3. Market destabilization and impact on competition:
With the Wal-Mart focus on cost control, volumes and Every Day Low
Prices (EDLP), it seems that consumers may, over time and after the initial
newness of Wal-Mart rubs off, choose convenience, range and quality over the
affordable products that Wal-Mart sells. Certainly this is one of the arguments
that proponents of allowing FDI in multi-brand retail are offering, i.e. the Indian
consumer will prefer to shop from the local mom-and-pop store and therefore the
small and large retail business can co-exist.
Burt and Sparks, in their paper titled Wal-Mart's World suggest that Wal-
Mart has appeared unconcerned about the state of the market. In their view, Wal-
Mart takes the position that its offer is so good, that over time, consumers will re-
evaluate their choices and elect to not go anywhere else but Wal-Mart. Evidence
from market tracking studies in America and Canada suggest after the initial lack
of concern by consumers over price, time changes the pattern quite quickly in
favor of Wal-Mart. Price steadily becomes more important in consumer's eyes
and Wal-Mart's market share, volume, and awareness climbs steeply (Sparks,
2006). Competition feels the Wal-Mart effect in two waves, short-term and long-
term. In the short term, the low price effect does not immediately impact
competition and who, in turn, react with competitive price cuts. In the long term,
it is the sustained application of EDLP pressure over a number of years through
price reductions, volume and store growth and reinvestment in margin reduction
that destabilizes the market. This destabilization forces consolidation, whether
directly (agreed mergers in China), indirectly by fear (Promodes/Carrefour
protective merger in France), or competitively (copying of the business model
and consolidation in the US, (Wrigley N., 2002).
Burt and Sparks further suggest that this destabilization does not occur
everywhere, and nor does it happen without reactions from existing retailers
such as Tesco in the United Kingdom, Metros in Germany, various supermarkets
in California, labor and government in Germany, suppliers in Argentina, Brazil,
Germany and Korea, regulator authorities in the UK. In the United States itself,
the expansion of Wal-Mart has been immense and discussion on range from
specific issues with communities, labor etc, to the very nature of Wal-Mart. At the
international level, the resistance is at two levels. The first is similar to debate on
the very nature of Wal-Mart and whether such development is desirable in
countries. The second level of resistance arises from the battleground with
existing retailers and other international retailers. The local businesses are
forced to react and under pressure, in some instances, governments and
regulatory authorities intervene to make Wal-Mart's development less rapid.
4. Internationalization of Wal-Mart
In international markets, Wal-Mart faces stiff competition from other
retailers, like Tesco, Carrefour and Ahold. It has not been a major success, though
the international revenues now form a substantial 25 per cent 2' of their global
revenues. In its constant search for lower costs, Wal-Mart has run into troubles
where its internal and external practices have been questioned. Their incessant
pressure on suppliers and need to control the entire supply chain to achieve
maximum margins has created resistance and seen Wal-Mart exit from
international markets, i.e. Germany. However, Wal-Mart is learning and adapting
to local needs in international markets. Supercenters across the world have
different merchandise mixes and balances, operational practices from one
country are transferred to another and ideas and formats are being placed where
they can enhance the business and meet market demands (Wrigley A. C., 2004).
IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
Implications of the Wal-Mart effect on India may be summarized as below:
e Supply side:
- Wal-Mart (and other domestic and international retailers) will cause a
shift in power from the middle-men in Mandi's 2 2 in India's APMC markets
and the trading community into the hands of large retailers
- The character of production will change. Wal-Mart demands flexible
production and small inventories and while SME's and other suppliers can
benefit from larger orders, they will need financial and technical
assistance to upgrade their capabilities and capacities. Currently Wal-
Mart India states that they source 90 per cent of goods and services
locally 2 3 but if volumes grow and the domestic manufacturing is not able
to keep pace, we will see Wal-Mart procure from China and other low-cost
destinations
- The character of distribution of freight will be forced to change. India's
internal logistics are primarily road and air based. There will be pressures
on the government to develop infrastructure to enable an efficient logistics
network. Wal-Mart's growth, as with domestic retailers, may be localized
to areas within States with better infrastructure.
2 Wal-Mart Annual Report 2010
2 Mandi's are wholesale markets for agriculture produce. Farmers bring their produce to Mandi's and sell to
government appointed middle-men.
India factsheet on Wal-Mart Facts, http://walmartstores.com/pressroom/factsheets/
* Demand side:
- The increase in economic growth, fueled by a rise in the younger educated
class will contribute to the success of malls in small towns (Mayo, 2010)
- There is growing literature which suggests that as modern retailing
expands its reach, consumer preferences change from being restricted to
products and services to includes a whole range of activities which define
the purchase experience. The attractiveness of stores is intended to draw
consumers and the ambience of organized retail provides a place to relax
as well as shop. Demand side pull for organized retail will force such
formats to diffuse fast throughout society (Mayo, 2010).
* Impact on small retail - destabilization of the market
- Competitive reaction and consolidation will happen. FDI inflows may go
towards M&A activity for consolidating traders, SMEs and perhaps even
some small retailers.
- The ability of small retailers, suppliers and middle-men to survive will
depend on institutional opportunities to access finance to grow their own
capabilities and capacities.
- Consolidation in agriculture land will remain an issue due to the various
land-rights issues within India. This can prove to be a challenge for large
retailers who need volume procurement. Experiments with farmers by
PepsiCo and Wal-Mart India so far are productive.
In summary, Wal-Mart's entry and growth may be slowed by intervention
and the lack of infrastructure in India. However, the need from farmers and
consumers will pull the large retailers to improve the choices and opportunities
from a demand side. Whether India can manage this growth will depend on the
strength of its institutions, domestic market and the choices it makes.
3.2. Foreign Direct Investment in India
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is, in essence, the creation or expansion of
firms that operate across national boundaries (Krugman, 1993). In principle,
Krugman and Graham argue that in thinking about FDI, the first part of
economic theory that should be consulted is not the theory of international
trade or capital movements, but the theory of the firm per se. A simple
definition of FDI is offered by Rachael McCullough as being "the acquisition by a
firm in one country of control over business activity in a second country"
(McCullogh, 1993). In examining why firms go across national boundaries,
many hypotheses may be offered, including the need for growth in production
and sales, competitive signaling, de-risking business from exchange rate
fluctuations, diversification of capabilities by learning from international
markets and reducing the cost of capital.
From the lens of FDI, Dunning synthesizes key elements of why firms
choose to invest in international locations in his paper "The Determinants of
International Production" (Dunning, 1973). The paper describes the following
determinants for internationalization, i.e. incurring the cost of expansion
through direct investment:
1. Ownership Advantage (0): Firms will invest only when they possess a
competitive advantage such as superior technology, managerial know-
how, established brands, or efficient channels for product distribution,
and can sufficiently exploit that advantage over local firms to offset the
cost of international coordination
2. Location Advantage (L): A firm will invest in a country if the foreign
production locations offer attractive factors including natural resources,
growing market and demand conditions, incentives and cost advantages.
3. Internalization (I): In addition to 0 and L, a company needs to
understand if it must internalize to capture the value generated by 0 and
L, i.e. appropriate the advantages it generates. Typically, given the basis
that a Multinational Corporation (MNC) will invest directly knowing it
can generate sufficient advantages over the domestic firms, an MNC
worries about its ability to sustainably exploit and appropriate the
advantages.
Given the above basis for understanding FDI, it should be understood that
international retailers like Wal-Mart will enter India only because the necessary
market and demand conditions exist where they can exploit and appropriate
the inefficiencies of the indigenous firms and markets.
Retail in India fares well among many factors that invite FDI, including
market size and growth, macroeconomic stability etc, however among the many
attempts by domestic firms to exploit organized retailing formats, some stores
and initiatives have already closed down, i.e. Subhiksha have closed down
(ATKearney, 2010). As previously in this paper, even though the Government
has allowed 100 per cent investment in cold chains24 , India has not seen any
investment of consequence either by domestic or international players.
ISSUES FOR (MULTINATIONALS) FDI IN INDIA
Building from the question on why India has not seen FDI or domestic
investment in the cold-chain leads us to the often asked comparable, i.e. why
China has attracted more FDI than India? Many blame the Government policies
as being too restrictive and anti-foreign investments, citing a culture of autarky
in India. Another argument relates to the difference in the differences in the
Diaspora of China and India (Balasubramanyam, 2004). Balasbramanyam
suggests that perhaps the Indian Diaspora, primarily located in the US and
employed as professionals, has chosen to invest in portfolios of investments,
primarily bank deposits against the Chinese Diaspora who, based out of East
Asia, have channeled FDI into China to take advantage of the low cost labor and
land.
While there are other arguments, I propose that the lack of attracting FDI
in India has more to do with the lack of faith by MNCs of their ability to
effectively internalize/capture the value of their investments in India. I use
portions of an article by Witold Henisz, titled "The Institutional Environment
for Multinational Investment" (Henisz, 2000) and various portions of the book
"Multinationals in India" (Nayak, 2008) to illustrate my proposal in the
following paragraphs. I discuss Nayak's model for FDI to complement with a
developing country's national objectives.
Warehousing and Refrigeration capabilities in the supply chain for perishable food items
In keeping with thoughts expressed earlier with reference to the OLI
framework for FDI, Henisz suggests that when multinationals enter new
markets, they are exposed to risks of expropriation from their joint-venture
partners and as political hazards increase, they are faced with an increasing risk
of opportunistic expropriation by the government. These transaction costs
arise due to two reasons:
1. Independent contractual hazards:
Henisz proposes three categories of contractual hazards, namely (i) asset
specificity - where a multinational may lose control over their investments
(sunk costs) in property, plant and equipment in the host country; (ii)
leakage of their technology and know-how, and (iii) free-riding on their
brand-name reputation by the joint-venture partner. As the potential gain
from expropriation of assets or of revenue streams increases, the joint
venture partner will use all means, including manipulation of the political
system to seize that return.
Example: Indian Equity in ITC Limited25
By 1907, the British American Tobacco company had invested in the
manufacturing, and selling of cigarettes and local trading of tobacco leaf
through its various subsidiaries in India. Until 1953, BAT wholly owned these
companies, when it was asked to dilute its equity by a proposal of the
Government of India. BAT adapted to this request due to their prior
experience in other 55 countries that they operated in and had faced similar
political pressure for national control. The dilution of BAT's equity began in
1954 and was 75 per cent in 1969, 60 per cent in 1974 and 40 per cent in 1976.
Table 8 shows the change in equity holding.
In 1994, J.N. Sapru, former chairman of ITC, stated that ITC does not need
BAT. In 1995 there were several counter allegations between K.L.Chugh, the
then chairman of ITC and BAT. This public drama on ownership followed a
spate of raids by the Enforcement Directorate 26 on grounds of ITC violating the
Foreign Exchange Regulations Act, 1973. The enquiries led to the arrest of
several top executives of ITC, including Chugh. By June 1997 BAT and ITC
resolved their differences as BAT licensed ITC to manufacture and sell some of
25 Case study of British American Tobacco (BAT) in India, from the book Multinationals in India (Nayak, 2008)
2 Monitoring body for Foreign Exchange regulations
its global brands, including 555, State Express and Benson & Hedges. Author
Amar Nayak notes that this episode is an aberration in a hundred year history
of BAT in India. However, this does typify the concern that some MNE's may
have regarding independent contractual hazards as discussed by Henisz.
Table 8: ITC equity holding, 1953 - 2004
Year BAT & Institutional 27  Indian F11 2 8  GDR 29  NR130
other (%) private (%) (%) (%)
foreign investors
companies (%)
(%)__ 
_
Until 1953 100 - - - - -
1954-64 94 - 6 - - -
1964-69 94 1 5 - - -
1969-74 75 10 15 - - -
1974-76 60 18 22 - - -
1976-84 40 30 30 - - -
1984-85 38 32 30 - - -
1985-86 31 32 36 - - -
2002-03 32.5 38.38 14.9 9.62 3.09 0.7
2004-05 32.40 38.38 12.73 17.49 2.98 0.60
Source: Multinationals in India, pg 101
2. Independent Political Hazards:
Henisz proposes that the second category of hazards that a multinational
corporation faces is from the State itself which - given its monopoly power on
legal coercion and its implicit presence in the background of every economic
transaction - poses a threat to the multinational corporations either through
policy shifts in taxation or regulation, or through outright expropriation.
The expropriation may benefit the government directly by transferring
revenue to government budgets or bank accounts of government officials.
27 Institutional: Indian Institutions
Fil: Foreign Institutional Investors
29 Global Depository Receipts
30 Non-Resident Indians
Also, the government may receive political benefits and mileage by
transferring assets or property rights to domestic ownership. However,
governments may also incur costs in terms of future loss or revenue from
multinational corporations and costs due to impact on domestic partners and
actual and potential employees of such multinational corporations.
Example: Maruti Udyog Limited& Suzuki Motor Corporation31
In a classic example of how India shut out foreign competition and
domestic industry, the Government of India (GOI), in 1953, passed a
legislation that all foreign car makers who assembled cars in India will need to
manufacture cars in India within 3 years. As a result, General Motors and
Ford Motor ceased their operations in India, in the same year. For the next 30
years, the passenger car industry was under-developed and left to the two
companies, Hindustan Motors and Premier Automobiles, who made one
model of a car each and sold approximately 50,000 cars per annum in total.
In 1969, Sanjay Gandhi, son of then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi started a
small passenger car company by the name Maruti Ltd. The company had little
success and was liquidated in 1977, when by an act of Parliament, the car
company was acquired by the GOI ad became a public sector company,
renamed as Maruti Udyog Limited (MUL). The GOI then sought international
bids and on October 2, 1982, signed a joint venture with Suzuki Motor
Corporation (SMC).
Through the partnership, SMC invested to develop and strengthen a
cluster around itself in an otherwise under-developed car components
market. A list of car component vendors promoted by SMC is shown in Table
9. Within 25 years, SMC had set up several group companies in India, with
stakes in car component manufacturing companies to car financing and
insurance companies, three wholly owned subsidiaries in insurance and
distribution services and two joint ventures with car component
manufacturers.
31 Case study of Suzuki Motor Corporation and Maruti Udyog Limited, from the book Multinationals in India
(Nayak, 2008)
Table 9: List of car component vendors promoted by SMC/MUL
S. No Component Manufacturer Components manufactures
1. Bharat Seats Ltd Car seats
2. Caparo Maruti Ltd Sheet metal sub-assemblies
3. Climate Systems India Ltd. Aluminum radiators
4. Denso India Ltd. Parts and components
5. J.J. Impex (Delhi) Private Ltd. Service & repair
6. Jay Bharat Maruti Ltd. Sheet metal components
7. Krishna Maruti Ltd. Car seats
8. Machino Plastics Ltd. Injection plastic parts
9. Mark Auto Industries Ltd. Automotive assemblies &
components
10. Mark Exhaust Systems Ltd. Exhaust systems & door sashes
11. Nippon Thermostat (India) Ltd. Automotive components
12. Sona Koyo Steering Systems Steering gear systems
Ltd.
13. Suzuki Metal India Ltd. Aluminum die casting, cylinder
block etc
14. Subros Ltd. Air conditioning, coolers,
refrigerators
15. Asahi India Glass Ltd. Tempered glass for cars
Source: Multinationals in India, pg 142
In 1983, the GOI held 74 per cent stake in MUL and SMC held 26 per cent.
Over years, SMC increased its stake from 26 per cent in 1983 to 40 per cent in
1989 and 50 per cent in 1992. In 2004, SMC held 54.2 per cent and a majority
control in MUL.
In keeping with Henisz's hypothesis of independent political hazards, SMC
experienced difficult times with the GOI in 1997, when the government
appointed their nominee, R.S.S.L.N Bhaskarudu as the Managing Director of the
company. SMC expressed its concern over this appointment and faced
resistance from the government. This problem continued till August 1999,
when Bhaskarudu resigned. Issues still persisted due to what SMC viewed as
an act of expropriation by the government and therefore reduced its
investment in MUL between the period of disagreement, 1997 - 2001. In 2000,
SMC bargained hard with the government and (in keeping with Heinsz's
observations where the government and supporting industry stands to lose
revenues) were successful in buying a part of the GOl equity to increase its
stakes and gain a controlling ownership.
Relevance to the Retail FDJ scenario:
Ownership is a major motivator for foreign companies to invest in new
markets and many companies, including Wal-Mart and other foreign
companies will be averse to invest in the development of infrastructure and
supporting industries if the GOI sticks to its current approach of not
allowing the foreign retailers a greater ownership and access to markets,
where they can internalize the gains.
A SUCCESSFUL FDI FRAMEWORK - ALIGNING PROFIT AND
NATIONAL INTEREST
Within the same examples of BAT and MUL, author Amar Nayak proposes
that the Government of India and these foreign companies were able to
complement and integrate the business goals with the (host) country's goals,
i.e. India. Barring a few issues as highlighted above, these companies have
done phenomenally well for themselves and for the economy as a whole.
The policies have included protectionist adaptations for India, including
import substitution by complying with the government's requirement to
source locally and develop local vendors, investment in the social sector and
localization of management and ownership over time. Figures 10 and 11
respectively show the development approach taken by BAT/ITC and MUL/SMC
in India.
A review of the partnership approach demonstrates that with a good
understanding and appreciation of mutual goals, a multinational corporation
can effectively integrate business and country goals to become true
transnational companies.
Figure 10: Holistic FDl pattern of BAT / ITC, 1906 - 2004
Source: British American Tobacco, 1906-2004, Multinationals in India, pg 105
Figure 11: Holistic FDI pattern of MUL & SMC, 1982 - 2004
Source: Suzuki Motor Corporation, 1982-2004, Multinationals in India, pg 157
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IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
The literature in economics is not very clear on whether Infrastructure
development follows FDI or if FDI follows infrastructure. The government of
India is clearly hoping, or at least marketing, that FDl in organized, multi-brand
retail will remove supply side bottlenecks, invest and improve infrastructure in
the food supply chain, ease inflation and boost India's agriculture exports. In
inviting such FDI, the questions of whether FDI will displace domestic industry
or whether governments and local joint venture partners will expropriate the
competitive advantage and investments of foreign multinationals are real issues
and need to be considered very carefully.
Nilesh Kampani, India's answer to Warren Buffet, suggests that India
needs Infrastructure and clear policies before it invites FDI. His interview on a
website32 is titled "India does not need FDI" and he is quoted as suggesting that
the investment coming in from FII's are more than adequate for the financing
needs that India has (Kampani, 2006). While the title of the interview and spin
on the conversation appeals to the pro-Indian, protectionist populism, I think
what he is referring to is that India needs long term, infrastructure improving
and committed FDI. In the absence of such material commitment, the only
difference between FII flows and FDI remains the percentage of investment in
organizations, while still keeping the nature of capital, volatile and hot. In my
view, Mr. Kampani is suggesting that India needs to mature and put in place a
mechanism that is devoid of constant political interference, before we invite
long-term FDI. The risk of large, committed monies leaving India (like when
Coca Cola left India in 1977 after the government asked it to hand-over the
secret recipe) are more damaging for investor confidence in the long run than
the flows of hot money.
Notwithstanding, India is compared to China and its inability to attract FDI
is cause for many a case study on what not to do. In analyzing the growth
approaches that India and China have taken, Martin Wolf describes the
differences as being a factor of political and social philosophies. Quote: "China
has accepted both growth and social transformation. India welcomes growth
but tries to minimize social dislocation... Chinese politics are developmental,
while India's politics remain predominantly clientelist" (Wolf, 2005).
http://www.rediff.com/money/2006/apr/03minter.htm
The questions facing India, with regard to FDI in multi-brand retail are not
new. The government has been discussing this in various forms since 1993. We
also have examples where India has successfully managed long term FDI and
developed many industries in India, on the back of great partnerships. These
successes are a cause for many an international company to want to invest in
India, despite the political wrangling that continues. However, the implications
of such stagnation in decision making are clear - they come at the cost of
development and force many in India to continue to live lives in poverty.
3.3. Section Review
The purpose of this chapter was to address the question of whether India
should invite foreign direct investment in organizing retail. Wal-Mart has long
held its infamous crown of being the chief corporate villain which displaces
markets and causes small mom-and-pop stored to close down. As argued in this
chapter, this fear is not unfounded. However the immediacy of the impact is
perhaps exaggerated. A McKinsey report projects that India is still in Stage 1 of
organized retail (Figure 12) and suggests that based on the adoption patterns of
organized retail in developing countries, it will take organized retail in India
anywhere from 5 to 15 years to gain a scale of any relevance (McKinsey, The
Great Indian Bazaar, 2008).
Figure 12: Adoption of organized retail
EARLY DAYS FOR ORGANISED RETAIL Phase 4
Phase 1 Phase 2 Consolidated Mature
Fragmented Exploratory
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:otal
market
Source: McKinsey - The Great Indian Bazaar, 2008
While the McKinsey study should allay fear of immediate displacement of
small retailers and traders, it is perhaps too pessimistic on the speed at which
this change may occur. Other reports suggest that developing economies are
adapting to organized retail much faster, driven primarily by their demand side
characteristics (ICRIER, Multibrand Retail, 2008). Notwithstanding, this
provides the Government with an opportunity to develop and introduce
adequate competition policies to protect the industry from being taken over by
multinational companies. Also, Wal-Mart will face competition from other
international large format players and the entry of many players will help to
create a more efficient market for agriculture products.
As demonstrated in the various examples of industries that have been
incubated and developed by the Government of India, Retail presents another
unique and large opportunity for the Government to work with the
international private players to revive this industry. However, it must be
understood that in the absence of clear policies and regulations to support the
small retailers and middle-men, they will be squeezed out. Therefore, the
Government needs to be proactive and ensure adequate industry status, clear
policies, access to finance, promotion of related and supporting small and
medium industries, education and vocational skills training, to ensure small
mom-and-pop stores with the ambition to grow can expand their operations;
and the ones that get displaced, are absorbed in related and supporting small
and medium scale industries.
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CHAPTER 4 - Summary & Analysis of Responses
to DIPP Discussion Paper
As part of its decision making process, the Government of India released a
discussion paper on whether the country should allow foreign participation in multi-
brand retail. The discussion paper released acknowledged various issues facing the
retail sector, and in particular the inefficiencies of the agriculture sector. The report
outlined the experience of various countries in their attempts to organize retail and the
positive and negative impacts thereof Also, the discussion paper quoted various
research publications including those sponsored by the government and independent
research conducted. The discussion paper has sought responses to twelve (12) specific
questions from the people of India and interested parties internationally. This chapter
reviews thefeedback received and attempts to map the interests of stakeholders in this
decision.
4.1. GOI discussion paper & Analysis of feedback received
In general, the private sector and international respondents have
applauded the DIPP for a well researched and thoughtful discussion paper.
Opponents have voiced their concerns suggesting that the paper projects a pro-
FDI stance by arguing that the government administered procurement and
supply chain has become inefficient, causing lack of transparency in prices and
impacting inflation. Following is a summary of observations:
Support for Discussion Paper:
" The discussion paper is timely.
" It highlights the issues facing wastage in public distribution system
o Provides relevant international experience as reference
e ICRIER report, base for the discussion paper, has been appreciated
Opposition for Discussion Paper:
" Overemphasis on ICRIER report
e The discussion paper has been released in English only and many have
demanded that the Government release the discussion paper in Hindi for
broader participation
" Overemphasis on benefits to consumers and farmers has been seen as
being simplistic and ignoring the power relationships in supply chains
" Lack of alternate or supporting recommendations, i.e. industry status for
retail, increasing access to credit and long term financing for small
retailers, improvements in skills training, acknowledgment and plan for
dealing with displaced jobs. This leads the respondents to suggest that the
paper is essentially narrow in focus, i.e. to force discussion on FDI as the
solution to many problems, including inflation
Other issues which impact the acceptance of the discussion paper:
" Some respondents argue that retail between food and non-food items
need to be differentiated as the responses will change depending on focus
" Many highlight inherent contradictions in the discussion paper, asking for
job reservations for rural youth, yet also suggesting that multi-brand retail
be restricted to urban cities
" Most respondents have not attempted to respond to questions relating to
international trade negotiations, i.e. TRIMS; and have also generally
avoided answering questions on whether the penalties should civil or
criminal or both.
Key insights:
* Respondents have asked for Retail to be recognized as a formal industry,
with a centralized Regulatory Authority to establish guidelines and
reduce bureaucracy
* The need for long-term financing is highlighted through many comments
" Inability of domestic industry to establish effective retail and lack of FDI
in cold-chains, even though allowed 100% through direct route, is a vote
from multinationals against India's FDI attractiveness (examined further
in Section 3.4).
SUMMARY DATA ANALYSIS
In response to the discussion paper, the DIPP received and posted all
responses received on their website33. After removing responses which were
submitted by the same person twice and others which were scanned in more than
once, the total unique responses received amount to 163. Of these, 94 per cent
(154 responses are from the domestic respondents) while 6 per cent (9
http://dipp.nic.in/
responses are from foreign respondents). Foreign respondents include multi-
national retail companies, like Wal-Mart, Carrefour and Metro who have presence
in India and consulting firms like Deloitte and the Nielsen Company. Foreign
respondents also include the US and UK chambers of commerce.
In summary, 100 per cent of foreign respondents replied in favor of
opening multi-brand retail in India, while only 31 per cent of domestic
respondents voted in favor. In the large chunk of responses, i.e. domestic
respondent, an overwhelming 71 per cent of respondents voted against opening
of multi-brand retail (Figure 13). Two domestic respondents suggested very
specifically and crafted their entire response for non-food multi-brand retail and
have been shown in the Conditional category.
Figure 13: Summary response to DIPP survey
Conditional,
1% Conditional, 1%
Total Respondents Domestic Respondents
Source: Author
Figure 14, shows all domestic respondents (154 in total) by various
categories and their responses. In an attempt to understand the origin of various
views, I have classified them as described below. It can be seen that the maximum
responses are from traders and merchants associations.
* Urban Individual (15 responses) - professionals, government officials
replying in their personal capacity and students
e Rural Individual (7 responses) - farmers
e Rights organizations (7 responses) - includes consumer rights committees,
industry opinion polling organizations and the activist groups
* Consultants/Experts/Academics (14 responses) - includes responses from
consulting firms, experts in policy and retail industry and professors at
management universities in India
* Retailers (6 responses) - responses from retail companies like Spice retail and
the Future group plus other small retailers
* Manufacturers & Industry (4 responses) - primarily DCM Shriram and small
enterprises
* Traders and associations (80 responses) - various traders and merchants
associations
* Chambers of Commerce (21 responses) - includes district level chambers
Figure 14: Domestic respondent views by detailed categories
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OPPOSITION BY TRADERS
The distinction between trader associations and chambers of commerce at
the district level at best blurry and for a better understanding of how the overall
traders and merchants associations view this issue, against the individual (rural
and urban respondents) and other, I have clubbed traders, traders
associations and chambers of commerce into the same category as traders.
Individuals include rights organizations and the Private Sector includes
manufacturers and retailers. Figure 15 shows that 59 per cent of Individuals, 79
per cent of Academia and experts and 40 per cent of the Private Sector are in
favor of opening FDI in multi-brand retail; against 90 per cent of the trading
community who have voted against the proposal.
Figure 15: Divergence of trader's views with rest of respondents (domestic)
Individuals
100%
Traders Academia
" Yes
" No
Private Sector
Source: Author
With 101 out of 154 domestic responses, the trader's community
represents 66 percent of domestic responses and 62 per cent of all responses.
This skews the data highly in proportion of the domestic traders. Further, of the
101 traders, 64 come from the State of Tamil Nadu, thereby causing the traders
from the State of Tamil Nadu to represent 42 per cent of the overall responses
received (Figure 16). With 100 per cent of traders in Tamil Nadu having voted
against FDI in multi-brand retail, the voice of 5 farmers (the only rural
representatives in the entire population) from Punjab (see Appendix 1) who have
all voted positively to allow foreign direct investment are completely drowned.
This assumes that the comments from any sector of the society are only weighted
by the number of responses received. This analysis is therefore biased
towards respondents who had access to a computer, internet and understood
English. This bias is consistent with the inherent bias of the Discussion paper and
opposition received by the Government for not having released this paper in
Hindi and through other channels.
Figure 16: Traders responses by State
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The difference in responses from various States is consistent with the
theory of backward and forward States. The shaded portion between the States
of Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and West Bengal represent the three backward
States whose traders have responded. Together they account for 6 per cent of
trader's responses while the forward and southern States of Tamil Nadu and
Karnataka represent 73 per cent of responses.
Interestingly, 85% of responses by traders from Tamil Nadu are exactly
the same. Therefore, if one letter in Tamil Nadu were to change, the number of
respondents in favor of opening FDI in multi-brand retail would increase
from the current 31percent to 64 per cent. This swing would cast the ballot in
favor of opening FDI in multi-brand retail.
FEEDBACK FROM THE REST OF INDIA
While the previous analysis focuses on the voting of yes and no, Table 10 outlines
feedback on additional questions by using data from respondents who have voted 'yes'
for FDI in multi-brand retail. As the number of people who have answered any specific
question is small and inconsistent, it is presented in a tabular form as a summary of
responses. I do not attempt to present any analysis of this data as it is small and
inconsistent. However, the comments provide interesting insights to potential solutions
that the Government could choose to implement. The table includes comments by Wal-
Mart India 34, received by the DIPP for each of the questions asked.
Table 10: Comments by each question
Question Yes No Depends Blanks35  Comments
1. Should there be a 11 18 134 8 - suggested 49%; 8 -
Cap on FDI? If so, suggested 51%
how much? Wal-Mart has suggested they
preferred no caps but were
willing to accept caps for
political reasons
2. Should FDI be 17 15 131 All 15 "No's" - suggest that FDI
leveraged for investment will happen
backend automatically and therefore
infrastructure there is no need to mandate.
development and Wal-Mart subscribes to this
what percentage view
should be
stipulated A unique suggestion was to
instill a minimum capitalization
like n place for NBFC 36, in
addition to Zoning to ensure
such facilities are outside the
cities and closer to farmers
3 Available on the DIPP public website http://dipp.nic.in/
3 Includes 101 respondents who said NO to FDI, therefore all their other responses have been disregarded and
considered as blank. This also includes 2 responses who said YES to FDI, conditional to being for non-food
items. Their responses to all other questions have been included as stated in their letters.
36 Non Banking Financial Companies
Question Yes No Depends Blanks 35  Comments
3. Should a 8 19 1 135 Questions raised on the
minimum definition of "backend"
threshold infrastructure. Also,
investment be suggestions highlight that
mandated to mandating a certain amount
establish will distort and put undue
"genuineness"? If pressure to "show" certain
so, how much investment, leading to
should it be? inefficient allocation of capital
People who approved have
suggested various figures
ranging from 25 million to 100
million, or up to 50% in the first
5 years. Wal-Mart suggests 100
million to be invested over 5
years in the food category;
while recommending no
stipulation in the non-food
category
4. Should job 6 23 1 133 Interestingly, not many people
reservations be are in favor of reservations.
mandated for rural The options suggested include:
youth? Retailers to spend 2.5% of
annual revenue to develop rural
infrastructure like classrooms,
parks, sewage treatment, public
dispensaries, broadband
connectivity etc
Provide skills training to rural
youth. Wal-Mart subscribes to
this opinion and has stated
success in Brazil in using this
approach
Question Yes No Depends Blanks35  Comments
Opponents highlight that the
reservation question
contradicts question 7 of the
DIPP questionnaire suggesting
that the stores will open in
urban areas. Also, some fear
that reservations will cause
flight of manpower into cities
and further exacerbate the
issue of urban poverty in India.
Opponents inquire if domestic
large retailers will be subject to
the same conditions
5. Should we 13 16 1 133 The general feedback received
stipulate a states that the SME sector is
minimum already involved and will
percentage of continue to be a part of the
procurement from supply chain. Some feedback
the SME 37 sector? worries that mandating a
certain percentage of
procurement will lead to undue
pressures on SME's - primarily
because the large retailer need
large volumes at short or just-
in-time deliveries which the
SMEs will not be able to meet.
Wal-Mart has suggested a
commitment for 50% local
procurement.
Suggestions for reservation
suggest varying minimum
procurement numbers from 10
to 50 per cent.
Small and Medium Enterprises
Question Yes No Depends Blanks 35  Comments
Suggestions include
recommendations to start small
and develop with retailers to
ensure smooth functioning and
growth of the sector. Access to
financing was brought up in the
suggestions.
6. Can small 22 4 137 Many think that the Cash-and-
retailers benefit carry format already takes care
from the logistics of this need. Suggestions
infrastructure recommend a commitment to
developed? And serve local retailers in varying
should a minimum ranges from 25 to 50%.
percentage of sales
be mandated to Opponents suggest that the
small retailers? 'power' will shift from
government and market forces,
however inefficient, to the large
retailers
Wal-Mart has suggested that
large retailers should develop
an additional 1/3 square foot in
cash-n-carry stores for every
square foot of multi-brand
retail. It also asks for parity in
enforcing such requirement on
domestic large retailers.
7. Should stores be 3 21 1 138 Opponents state that cities
allowed only in already have shopping malls
cities with a and do not see the benefit.
population > Responses in favor suggest that
1,000,000? Should these outlets should be opened
a 10km area in poor and rural areas as the
outside the need is greatest there. Others
municipal/urban argue that this there should be
agglomerations be no restrictions.
included in the
Question Yes No Depends Blanks35  Comments
definition of the Wal-Mart has suggested that
city for setting up limiting to this size will severely
such ventures? impact the efficiency of logistics
making them sub-optimal. It
has recommended the limits to
200 cities with population of
200,000. Wal-Mart
recommends including a 10km
perimeter in view of the real
estate prices and availability.
8. Are the 5 2 156 By far, this is one question that
conditions being people have been hesitant to
proposed in answer. Most responses
compliance with suggest that the Government
TRIMs? Can they either knows best or they
be harmonized should hire expert counsel on
across foreign and this matter
domestic retailers
and will such A few individuals have
conditions be in suggested that such conditions
compliance with will be out of compliance with
Article 301 of the TRIMs. Wal-Mart and a few
Indian others suggest that should the
Constitution? Government require conditions
on indigenous procurement, it
should apply to the domestic
retailers as well
9. Should there be 6 15 1 141 Comments suggest that the
an exclusive current regulatory environment
regulatory and bureaucracy is inefficient.
framework? Suggestions also state that the
Should there be a current APMC 38 do not help
Shopping Malls small holder farmers
Regulation Act?
And should
3 APMC - Agriculture Produce Market Committees constituted by State governments and Union Territories to
manage the buying and selling of agricultural commodities. The APMC Act in each State requires that all
agricultural products be sold only in government regulated markets.
Question Yes [Nol Depends Blanks 35 Comments
intervention be at
the Center or State
levels?
10. Should the
Government retain
first right to
procure? Or
should the
government put a
mechanism to
collect levies if
buffer food stocks
fall below a
142
Recommendations highlight the
need for recognizing Retail as
an industry, a Regulatory
framework for promotion and
monitoring of retail, single
window clearance and
enhanced financing and credit
facilities for retailers to be
made available
Comments also highlight the
role for the new Competition
commission in protecting the
market from monopolistic
environments
Wal-Mart's comments are
against the establishment of a
Shopping Mall Regulation act,
which seems to be in
consonance with the general
feedback. Wal-Mart suggests
that the Government could
outline a policy which restricts
multi-brand retailers to open
stores with a minimum of 2,000
square feet
The feedback in general has
been that the Government
PDS 39 system is inefficient and
ignores market prices. The
suggestions state that
distribution will benefit with
the infrastructure investments
due to opening of retail. A few
respondents have suggested
that the Government should
39 Public Distribution System to collect, store and distribute food
Question Yes No Depends Blanks 35  Comments
minimum retain the right to procure first
threshold? stressing that it should be at
market prices. Some
respondents suggest that it is
not the amount of food but the
lack of warehousing and
storage that needs to be solved.
Wal-Mart's comments are
consistent with the feedback
received.
11. Should 12 11 140 Response here has been similar
permissions be to question 9. Respondents
granted by a stress the need for single
centralized window clearance and
authority and improving the regulatory
should this also mechanism.
monitor Cash-n-
Carry outlets? Wal-Mart highlights the ICRIER
report which has a list of 40
existing licenses required to
open retail stores
12. Should penalties - - - - This is the only question where
be civil, criminal or everyone, by mostly not
both? What responding or by making a brief
additional suggestion about the Indian
penalties should legal system, have agreed that
be imposed? the existing Civil procedures,
along with FEMA 40 and other
provisions including criminal
proceedings when applicable,
are adequate.
Source: Author
40 Foreign Exchange Management Act
The comments in Table 10 provide useful feedback and sense of how the
people's sentiment and Wal-Mart's view (overly generalized as being
representative of the international retailers view) can help form policy. However,
as highlighted previously, the number of people who have answered in
affirmative to opening of FDI in multi-brand retail is overshadowed by the
number of people who have objected.
In particular, there are only five farmers in the entire population, and they
are in support of opening FDI in multi-brand retail. Their response is written in
Hindi and is a one page letter stating that they don't get the right price, right
weighing of produce nor do they get full money. They say that they have been
selling to the company over the last 2-3 years and that they want to sell maximum
produce to the company41 .
4.2. Mapping the Stakeholders
All respondents to the Discussion Paper floated by the DIPP, Government
of India, may be seen as either influencing the decision (Influencer's) to open FDI
in multi-brand retail or as opposing by providing a polarizing view (Polarizer's),
as shown in Figure 17.
Figure 17: Influence of various stakeholders
Source: Author
41 Mohd Haneef - response pack number 30 in the DIPP website
In terms of the diversity of views across the spectrum, we have seen a
broad cross-section of the society to be in favor of opening FDI in multi-brand
retail. However, as presented in Section 4.1, the number of responses has been
dwarfed by the sheer volume of polarizing views from Traders in the country,
mainly comprised of responses from the traders in Tamil Nadu.
The Influencers argue for opening the sector by citing a multiplier effect
on growth and productivity to the nation, while at the same time acknowledging
the challenges of introducing modern, organized retail, in a predominantly
unorganized sector. The Polarizer's have predominantly attacked international
organized retail, while not focusing on similar impact by domestic organized
retail as much. Their appeal is based on demonstrating strength in numbers.
Given the immense influence this lobby has on the government in the State
of Tamil Nadu and also the knock-on effect they have on trader lobbies in the
States of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, both adjoining southern States in India,
any solution to the government's proposal to open FDI in multi-brand retail will
have to resolve or confront their opposition. In today's environment of coalition
politics, confronting this lobby may prove to be detrimental perspective of this
lobby and design programs and policies that can effectively address their
concerns. The perspective of the Tamil Nadu trader's lobby is presented below as
a result of how they perceive the issue on hand, the impact on their interests,
institutions involved in promoting this agenda and the information that the
traders' lobby has.
4.3. Section Review
In summary, my analysis of the data leads me to the conclusion that the
representation of views available to the DIPP and Government of India, through
this discussion paper is not adequate to form the basis of a policy decision. At
best, it brings some voices to the front and policy makers will do well to view this
information as being another data set which, by itself, is inconclusive. The
discussion paper has served as an instrument to put information out to the
people. Other uses for the Government could be to use this information to target
communication and understanding of the issues faced by the Traders, particularly
in Tamil Nadu and attempt to educate and design a solution that is economically
sound and implemented to limit avoidable losses.
x
CHAPTER 5 - A Three Lens Analysis
The 3-Lens analysis is based on "Managing for the Future: Organizational
Behavior and Processes", by Deborah Ancona, Tom Kochan, John Van Maanen and
Eleanor Westney. The analysis is built further based on research by Eleanor
Westney, using the same approach, on issues facing NGO's. The three lenses,
Structural, Political and Cultural, provide a multi-faceted perspective of looking at
problems and ensuring we see the "whole" issue and not only that which resonates
with our individual ways of thinking and responding to events around us. The
divergent views and inability of a large body of people to agree on the benefits and
challenges of organizing and introducing foreign players in multi-brand retail in
India, is an example of how various stakeholders are seeing only that which
resonates with them and ignoring the "whole" picture.
In my analysis, I stretch this model, which has been used to look at
organizational issues, to apply theframeworkfor a country, as an organization.
5.1. The Three-Lens Analysis
In order to solve a problem, it is helpful to have a rich understanding of
organization, issues, sources of issues, range of approaches that can be taken
etc. When asked, different people summarize the problem and solutions from
their perspective. If they had a better, even wider understanding of the larger
organization, they might see different perspectives and realize the problem may
be somewhere else. Essentially, who we are and what we do is often shaped by
the environment and constraints around us, and that which shape us. The
authors of "Managing the future" cite an often-told parable about three-blind
men to bring out the singularity of individual viewpoints:
Three blind men were asked to describe what an elephant is like. One blind
man felt the elephant's tail and observed, "An elephant is very much like a piece of
rope." The second blind man felt the elephants' side and observed, "'An elephant is
very much like a wall." The third blind man felt the elephant's trunk and observed,
"An elephant is very much like a pipe." Each was right. And each was incomplete
and partly misguided.
Ancona et.al, suggest that in an organizational context, our individual ways
of thinking and responding to events around us (our personal schema42 ), are
transcribed into organizational ways of thinking as organizational schemas.
The organizing of work in a particular manner, perspectives, values etc
represents what defines an organization. Such schema helps individuals find
recurring patterns in everyday complex situations, in the absence of which,
each task would be a monumental new project. It is however, the nature of
schemas itself, which also leads us astray. Schemas tend to become "outdated",
are "resistant to change", have the tendency to become "universal rules" and as
such have the same problem as the interpretation of an elephant by the three
blind men, they are "incomplete" and silo'ed not allowing new thoughts and
perspectives to influence a different tomorrow. To observe these schemas and
understand what is really going on Ancona et.al, based on years of research,
propose three lenses. The lenses are:
1. The Structural Design Lens: A resource space, viewed as a flow of
inputs & outputs, flow of tasks and information, sorted by roles and
structures and defined rational optimization to achieve organizational
goals.
2. The Political Lens: A relationship between how power and influence
are distributed and wielded, how different stakeholders express their
perspectives and get involved in (or get excluded from) decisions.
3. The Cultural Lens: A view of how history has shaped assumptions and
meanings of different people, and how practices and artifacts take on
specific meaning to translate into stories and rituals which shape a
culture.
Applying the 3 lens approach to the decision making process of the
Government of India first requires us to understand the various factors
influencing the retail market in India and define what factors constitute the
various lenses, before we look at their interplay and influence in decision
making. Figure 18 shows the construct of the issue:
42 A schema, as defined by social psychologists, is a cognitive structure that represent organized knowledge
about a given concept or type f stimulus, A schema contains both the attributes of the concept and the
relationship among the attributes - (Fiske and Taylor, 1984)
Figure 18: Three Lenses
Source: Adapted from Eleanor Westney
At the core, the market may be understood as a resource space, which is
defined by various inputs and outputs. A simple Porterian 5-forces analysis at
the company and industry level, and a review of Porter's diamond of national
advantage at a country level would reveal the various structural factors at play
within the retail market. The second layer defines the various interests of
stakeholders and social actors who have a stake in the decision and influence
the politics of the situation. The outer layer represents the reputational field
which describes the norms developed within stakeholders and social
participants which guide what image they want to project to others and how
they see their own organizations. This third layer defines the cultural construct.
This section reviews the issues regarding FDI in multi-brand retail from
three different lenses, structural, political and cultural.
A VIEW FROM THE STRUCTURAL LENS
From an FDI lens, Michael Porter's diamond model for competitiveness of
nations may be seen as satisfying the Location advantages (L) that constitute
the eclectic OLI framework discussed in Section 3.4. In continuation of the
argument that multinationals, when looking to engage in FDI, look for various
factors including the nation's factors of production, skilled labor or
infrastructure, demand conditions, the existence and maturity of related and
supporting industries, and the nature of firm strategy, governance and domestic
rivalry that exists, Porter states that national prosperity is created, and not
inherited (Porter, 2008). Below is an analysis of the retail landscape in India,
using Porter's Diamond of National Competitiveness:
1. Factor conditions:
For factor conditions to be of competitive advantage, they must involve
sustained investment to develop and create important factors of production,
such as skilled human resources or a scientific base. The mere existence of a
large pool of labor or local raw materials do not constitute an advantage, or
at least they do not translate into any meaningful advantage, unless they are
developed, specialized and matured to become an advantage that is unique
to the country by virtue of not being easily replicable (Porter, 2008).
a. Agriculture:
Food and groceries form an important and large part of any major
Retailer's basket of products. In the United States, groceries account for
51% of sales for Wal-Mart (Downing, 2011). In India, spend on food,
beverage and tobacco constitute 42% of spend is expected to remain the
biggest category by 2025 (McKinsey, The 'Bird of Gold': The Rise of India's
Consumer Market, 2007). Also, agriculture contributes to nearly 18% of the
GDP in India and employs more than 60 per cent of the population. India
has the second largest arable land after the United States and 97 per cent of
domestic needs are supplied by domestic production (USITC, 2009).
Despite the staggering size and improvement in India's agriculture
from food shortage and subsistence farming to self-sufficiency and
technology led-cultivation, the issues that plague productivity
improvements are a preponderance of small and marginal holdings for
about 82 per cent of total farm holdings, imperfect market conditions and
the lack of backward and forward linkages in the supply chain
(Ramaswamy, 2008).
b. Employment and skills development
The Government of India's annual Report to the People acknowledges
that the quality of employment in India is characterized by a predominance
of unorganized employment, which lowers earnings and lower job security.
The report estimates that 96 per cent of employment in India is in this
informal sector. In urban areas, the percentage of unorganized sector
workers is close to 65-70% and while not all are poor, the report estimates
that close to half of this number is in dire need of occupational up-scaling.
Also, the working environment is not conducive; working hours are long and
most of the conditions of decent employment (i.e. paid leave, pension,
bonus, medical support and health insurance, maternity leave benefits,
compensation against accidents, etc) are non-existent (Employment, 2010).
A World Bank report, prepared at the request of the Government of
India, highlights that continuing to raise labor productivity while at the
same time generating enough jobs for a growing labor force is proving to be
a major challenge for India. This issue has come into sharp focus over the
last decade where the economic growth has increased but employment
growth has fallen to less than half that of the 1980s ( also discussed in
Section 2.4 of this paper). The report suggests that the government's efforts
in developing vocational skills are not effective. The report highlights that
the supply of workers with vocational/technical skills has declined since
1980s and that their relative wages have also come down since 1990s. The
causality proposed is not that there is little demand for skilled workers, but
that the workers with technical/vocational qualifications do not have the
necessary skills that meet the labor market needs (WorldBank, 2007).
The overall factor conditions for Retail may thus be summarized as
being vastly under-developed and challenging. While the government
continues to develop and provide education and skills in the informal sector,
the fact that the private skills training and education in the informal sector
is weak, continues to be a challenge for improving the quality of the
workforce.
From the perspective of large retailers, they will face the challenge of
training employees from the informal sector and providing the skills
necessary to the functioning of their outlets and operations.
Bharti Wal-Mart has already invested in two skills training centers in
the State of Punjab, where 5,550 candidates have enrolled and 1,050 have
been placed across the industry, including Wal-Mart's operations in India.
In March, 2011, Wal-Mart has announced a Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) with the Karnataka government to open similar training centers
(Bharti Walmart, Karnataka Government launch Skill Centre, 2011).
2. Demand Conditions:
The composition and character of the home market usually has a
disproportionate effect on how companies perceive, interpret, and respond
to buyer needs. The size of home demand proves far less significant that the
character of home demand (Porter, 2008)
With the growth in India's middle-class (covered in Section 2.4 of
this paper), McKinsey predicts that India will become the world's fifth
largest consumer market in the world (McKinsey, The 'Bird of Gold': The
Rise of India's Consumer Market, 2007). In the same report, McKinsey
suggests that consumption will quadruple, though on a per capita basis real
spending will remain modest at $1.065, which is still triple of today's levels.
Most of this increase is expected to be a result of change in income and not
so much due to savings or population changes. The geographic pattern of
India's income and consumption growth is expected to shift from being
predominantly rural (57 percent of consumption - due to the absolute size
of population - is in rural households) to becoming more urban. While the
initial income growth will be faster in the urban areas, the income and
consumption of rural households will reach today's urban levels by 2018.
Economic growth and urbanization of small towns and cities will
emerge as attractive markets and provide an opportunity for large retailers
to address the growing formal sector of the economy. By 2025, the Indian
consumer market is expected to become largely an urban affair, with 62
percent of consumption in urban areas (McKinsey, The 'Bird of Gold': The
Rise of India's Consumer Market, 2007).
3. Related and Supporting Industries:
The third component of national advantage is the presence of
related and supporting industries that are internationally competitive. Far
more significant than mere access to components and machinery, is the
advantage that home-based industries provide in innovation and upgrading.
This advantage results on the foundation of close working relationships
between suppliers and end-users located near each other and who can
leverage the advantages of short lines of communication, quick and constant
flow of information and on-going exchange of ideas and innovations
(Porter, 2008).
In the discussion paper on whether India should allow FDI in multi-
brand retail, the Government of India has clearly acknowledged that even
though India is the second largest producer of fruits and vegetables, it has
very limited integrated cold-chain infrastructure and the supply chain is
highly fragmented and unable to distant markets without large loss of
produce (DIPP, 2010). The USITC report on Impact of Indian Tariff and
Non-tariff Measures on US Exports highlights that the marketing and
distribution inefficiencies result from high levels of government
intervention, poor quality and limited availability of storage and
transportation infrastructure, a lack of alternative sales outlets for farmers,
several layers of middle-men, inadequate grades and standards, and few
tools for risk management (USITC, 2009). The report also suggests that
these inefficiencies discourage the entry of U.S. firms into the Indian market
and increase the cost for firms already in the market.
A report by the Indian School of Business (ISB) highlights that India
has the potential for becoming the food basket for the world as it has all the
necessary factor conditions and a functioning agriculture system that meets
the large needs of the Indian population and is a net exporter. The paper
acknowledges that the overall efficiency and productivity of the food
processing sector can be vastly improved and thereby result in India
becoming a major supplier. The clusters around the food processing
industry need large investment and present opportunities for the private
sector. Internationally, retailers like Wal-Mart and Tesco have become the
channel masters and control this supply chain, while in India, there are no
superstores and the farm holding is small, leading to no economies of scale
and lack of investment in this sector so far (Vishwanadham, 2005). The
various clusters that exist, but in an informal manner and there is scope for
various clusters to grow (Figure 19). As an example of the potential for
development, even though India is the second largest producer of fruits and
vegetables, only 2 percent of this produce is processed, compared to 65% in
the U.S; also, only 26% of Marine products, 6% of poultry and 20% of Meat
are processed in India compared to 60-70% in developed countries. Milk is
another product that India is the second largest producer of in the world
and only 35% of this produce is processed compared to 60-75% in the
developed countries.
Figure 19: Food supply chain cluster
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Source: ISB, Can India be the Food Basket for the World (Vishwanadham, 2005)
4. Firm strategy, structure and rivalry:
National circumstances and context create strong tendencies in how
companies are created, organized, and managed, as well as what the nature of
domestic rivalry will be. No one managerial system is universally appropriate
and competitiveness in a specific industry results from the convergence of
management practices and organizational modes favored in the country and the
sources of competitive advantage for the industry (Porter, 2008).
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The firm strategy, structure and rivalry have to be understood for both the
agriculture markets and the retail sector which is, by definition, not granted an
industry status with the country. In agriculture, most of the farmers are small
holders. Agriculture, in India, is general is constrained from both the inputs and
outputs sides. In a case study (The ITC eChoupal Initiative, 2004) on soy-bean
farmers in the State of Madhya Pradesh in India, farmers were understood to lack
inputs and technology for seeds, fertilizers, herbicides and loose 60-70% of the
productivity of their crop. Farmers are required to sell only through the
government appointed mandi's (wholesale markets) which are further regulated
under the APMC scheme (Agriculture Produce Market Committees are
constituted by State governments and Union Territories to manage the buying
and selling of agricultural commodities. The APMC Act in each State requires that
all agricultural products be sold only in government regulated markets scheme).
Price discovery for the farmers happens after they tow their produce for miles to
the government wholesale market, where Government appointed Collection
Agents auction and agree on the price. Farmers face unfair practices in the way
their produce is weighed, the amount of time taken (which, in the absence of cold
storage and modern warehousing, affects the quality of produce and is subject to
pilferage) and also how they are paid. Often, the farmers are paid a portion of
what is owed with unofficial guarantees to pay the remainder amount at a later
date. The ITC e-Choupal initiative has taken permission from the Government,
established an alternative wholesale market for soy beans, with the caveat that
farmers would not be forced to sell at the ITC e-Choupal markets. ITC established
computers in villages with internet connectivity which gives price information at
the wholesale market and also global commodity prices, so that the farmers can
choose where they want to sell. At the wholesale market, ITC provides a resting
place for the farmers, automated and fair weighing of produce and ensure all
farmers are paid their total dues on the spot.
While the ITC e-Choupal initiative is very successful, this has not been
replicated by other private players at the same scale or with similar success.
Most of agriculture procurement and management of the supply chain is still in
the hands of the middle-men. The discussion paper on FDI in multi-brand retail
clearly highlights that "intermediaries dominate the value chain...they flout
mandi norms and their pricing lacks transparency. Wholesale regulated markets,
governed by State APMC Acts, have developed a monopolistic and non-
transparent character." (DIPP, 2010). The intermediaries include collection
agents and "traders" who further sell to the small retailers through APMC
markets in cities.
Small retailers in the cities and small towns procure from these traders
and have no other alternative. The small retailers predominantly are self-
employed due to many factors, including the lack of relevant and employable
skills. In a survey conducted by the ICRIER on the Impact of Organized Retailing
on the Unorganized Sector (ICRIER, Multibrand Retail, 2008), it found that access
to bank credit was very low among the surveyed unorganized retailers and only
12 per cent had availed themselves of in the year preceding the survey, i.e. 2007.
It is no wonder that in the same survey, only 7 percent of unorganized retailer
said they would like their children to continue with the same business.
In summary, a view from the structural lens suggests that the state of
farmers (upstream) and that of the small retailers and consumers (downstream)
is controlled by the intermediaries. Demand is clearly positioned to grow and the
supporting and related industries, including organized retail, are currently held
captive to old and now inefficient public distribution system through government
appointed wholesale markets and agents.
A VIEW FROM THE POLITICAL LENS
To understand the relationship of various stakeholders and social actors
who have a say in the decision on whether to allow FDI in multi-brand retail, we
need to first define who the stakeholders are. For the purpose of my analysis, I
view the stakeholders as being the major constituents who have responded to
the Government of India's discussion paper on this issue. Based on the sheer
volume of responses received and analysis presented in Section 3.2, it is
obvious that the majority stakeholder is the "trader's community" in the State of
Tamil Nadu. Farmers, small retailers, consumers, urban and rural unemployed,
professionals and academia are at best minority stakeholders in this discussion.
The political system, post Independence in 1947, has primarily been a single
party led, stable and dominant system under the leadership of the Indian
National Congress. The Congress party system started between the periods of
1967 - 77. The party saw increasing internal rifts and in 1977 and the
emergence of a new party, the Janata Party which was created in an effort to
forge a centrist alternative to the Congress Party. However, the initial
formation of the Janata Party and a subsequent two attempts, failed. The
second attempt was in 1989-91 with the emergence of the Janata Dal and the
third in 1996-98, with the emergence of the United Front which was a loose
alliance of 14 regional parties. Due to factionalism, personality clashes, and
ideological divisions, none of these alliances was able to survive for a full five-
year term (Hardgrave, 2007). This has led to the emergence of a new coalition
form of government, where even the Congress Party now is dependent on the
support of regional alliance partners to remain in power (Figure 20). The
current coalition led by the Congress, includes their alliance with the DMK Party
of the State of Tamil Nadu.
Figure 20: Coalition governments: The changing face of Indian politics
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Source: Steven I. Wilkinson, The Politics of Infrastructural Spending in India
(World Bank Report, July 31, 2006) pg 17
Robert Hardgrave, in his book, "India: Government and Politics in a
Developing nation", suggests that as demands and aspirations of the India
people have increased and as new groups have entered the political system, the
capacity of the government to respond effectively has not kept pace. He quotes
another author, Gunnar Myrdal43, as saying that under pressure from sectors of
society with a vested interest in preserving the inequalities of the status quo,
the Indian leadership has been undermined by the paradoxical position in
which it finds itself:
4 Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An inquiry into the Poverty of Nations, 3 vols (New York: Pantheon, 1968), pp,
1-117.
On a general and noncommittal level they freely and almost
passionately proclaim the need for radical social and economic
change, whereas in planning their policies they tread most warily
in order not to disrupt the traditional social order. And when they
do legislate radical institutional reforms -for instance in taxation
or in regard to property rights in the villages - they permit the laws
to contain loopholes of all sort and even let them remain unenforced.44
The dynamics of coalition governments makes politics extremely
competitive within India. The Coalition governments are formed and held
together by the judicious spreading around of loans, grants and subsidies
(Wilkinson, 2006). These funds are derived through a variety of sources:
membership dues, contributions, public meetings, business houses, traders,
contracts, nonresident Indians, cooperatives, industrial groups and the
underworld (Hardgrave, 2007). Rifts between coalitions can arise over many
issues and the ability of the Government (the incumbent Congress Party in this
case) to take action depends on their ability to garner support from the
coalition they have with regional parties.
Tamil Nadu and the Indian Government:
The incumbent Indian Government, led by the Congress Party has a 7 year
coalition with the current Government of Tamil Nadu, led by the DMK Party.
The Congress-DMK alliance is a major part of the current coalition form within
the incumbent national Congress party system. Over the past few months, there
have been a series of issues which could potentially rock the Congress-DMK
alliance (NDTV, 2011), including the internationally infamous 2-G telecom
scam, where the Minister of Telecom for the Government of India, a nominee
from the DMK government was arrested on corruption charges.
Incidentally, the State of Tamil Nadu is currently (March-April 2011) going
through its once-in-five-years, Assembly elections which will decide the fate of
the incumbent DMK government in Tamil Nadu. Off-late there have been many
corruption allegations against the DMK government, including reports that the
DMK government is giving bribes to poor people to vote for the Party in the
elections. Funds for these elections, like for other parties, come from various
traders lobbies. In Tamil Nadu, the previous ruling party AIADMK (All India
Anna DMK) got most of its funds from liquor and transport lobbies in Tamil
4Ibid
Nadu (Hardgrave, 2007), and with the current DMK government's ambitious
plans to give laptops to students in colleges who vote for them, the need for
funds is going to be high (Vasundara, 2011).
Given that Tamil Nadu is among the most urbanized States in India and has a
strong trader's lobby, neither the incumbent DMK government, nor the
Congress Party will be keen to take on the might of the traders who have
vociferously objected to the opening of FDI in multi-brand retail. This clientalist
approach towards the stronger sections of society is not new. Farmers have
previously complained against exploitation by traders lobbies in Tamil Nadu,
but there is no evidence that much has been done to correct the situation
(Ragunathan, 2004). The small landowners do not identify with the needs and
aspirations of the landless, giving rise to a new quasi-caste system, based on
social class/income. The situation is worse in Tamil Nadu which, along with its
neighboring States of Kerala and Andhra Pradesh, has a high proportion of
landless rural households 45. Fundamentally, Hardgrave quotes Baldev Raj
Nayar to sum up the political power of the class system:
"the levers of political and state power have rested in the hands of what may
be termed the "middle sectors" of economic and social life in both urban and
rural areas - the educated and professional groups, town merchants and small
businessmen in urban areas; and the middle peasantry or kulaks46 in
villages"47
A VIEW FROM THE CULTURAL LENS
Describing a Culture is perhaps the most difficult aspect of the three-lens
analysis. When trying to do so for a country as large and diverse as India, one
begins to wonder where to start from. In context of the issue on FDI in multi-
brand retail, I think three norms which have developed in India, i.e. divisive
politics on the basis of religion and caste, a tolerance for corruption and the
sentiment of autarky, are perhaps relevant to discuss.
4s Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Andhra have 34-37% landless against 12-23% Northern States of U.P, Madhya
Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab (Hardgrave, 2007)
46 Landowners in villages - they own between 2.5 to 15 acres of land each, and control 51% of the land,
constituting 35 percent of rural households and 25 percent of total population of India (Hardgrave, 2007)
47 Ibid Baldev Raj Nayar, "Political Mobilization in a Market Polity: Goals, Capabilities and Performance in India,"
in Robert I. Crane, ed., Aspects of Political Mobilization in South Asia (Syracuse: Maxwell School, Syracuse
University, 1976), pp. 148-49
The first issue is the approach of divisive politics. India contains all of the
world's major religions; it is subdivided into a myriad of castes; and it has 15
major languages, as well as 24 other languages, each spoken by 1 million or
more people, plus a large number of minor languages and dialects. India is the
world's largest democracy and sixty years of freedom have seen major changes
in politics and the society, where the country has gone from a single party
nationalist approach to divisive Hindu nationalism and is now experimenting
with consensus politics. India's diversity is at the same time, its strength and
weakness. The diversity by social class perhaps is the toughest challenge that
India has for economic growth and social justice. Political parties have used
such differences to garner votes by playing to the sentiment of poor people and
promising an improvement in their situation. Such divisive politics took an ugly
turn when the BJP and other parties came to power in 1998 on the basis of a
strong anti-Muslim propaganda. In 2004, the BJP lost to the Congress, and gave
the reigns to Dr. Manmohan Singh, who is seen as chief architect of India's
economic reforms. The good news for India is that the people voted for Dr.
Manmohan Singh again in 2009, and chose economic reforms over divisive
politics based on religion or caste.
The second issue that has pervaded in India is a tolerance of corruption.
While India's infrastructural needs are enormous and have been recognized by
international institutional investors, Indian business organizations and politics
remain the primary obstacle to India's economic growth (Wilkinson, 2006).
Wilkinson identifies two problems in infrastructural growth in India. The first
issue is the lack of resources, i.e. the large government deficit which is running
in excess of 80 percent arising from subsidies for agricultural inputs, train
travel and oil. The Thirteen Finance Commission (FC-XIII) has recommended a
calibrated exit from such fiscal expansionary measures and set a target of 68
percent by 2014-15, combined for Center and State governments
(EconomicSurvey, 2010). The second issue that Wilkinson identifies is that the
money that is being spent seems to be going waste, with spending spread across
too many small projects, no return on state investment in infrastructure and
poor quality of construction and maintenance. The state level audit reports
confirm that money is diverted to people and places that appear not to fit the
criteria of the programs. This corruption however is tolerated. Wilkinson
proposes the following reasons for which corruption is tolerated:
* Capital infrastructure projects create kick-backs to political parties
through which incumbents raise money and pay off party supporters.
Contractors and landowners are overpaid, paid early, given extra
payments etc. This guarantees that the political parties have some
influence over the "middle sectors" of society
Infrastructure spending is distributed in a clientilistic way to ensure
political support and votes. Wilkinson cites a study in Andhra where
"the voters are told and convinced that choosing a candidate who does
not have access to the minister is useless since he cannot get any
benefits for the village".
* Politicians frequently begin projects, which are unnecessary
duplications, in order to provide assurance to the people and also to
maximize political payoffs. The impact on infrastructural provision or
the ability to complete projects is not seen as being of consequence.
A solution to corruption is not easily found. There are many institutional
reforms that need to take place in India, starting with the Judiciary and
including the Education of India's people. In the interim, as the middle class
grows in India, many believe that this trend will change and people will
demand more transparency. The role of free press in India is crucial and is
playing an important role is bringing news and information across the country.
As more and more villages get electricity, cable television and
communications facilities, the politicians are finding it difficult to remain
corrupt.
The third norm that has shaped India's culture is the sentiment of autarky.
Post independence, the Indian people have sheltered themselves under the
umbrella of being self-reliant and not opening its doors to foreigners. This
sentiment is amply represented in the feedback received by the Government of
India, in response to the DIPP's discussion paper on FDI in multi-brand retail.
Many letters have said "after opening to the East India Company, we allowed
the British to rule us for 200 years. Why does this government want to repeat
the same mistake?"
As India's democracy grows older and India transforms to become a more
urban country, the strength of this argument is fading. The youth today are
influenced by western clothes and lifestyles. They aspire for life's they see
depicted through Indian and International cinema and as incomes grow, there is
ample evidence that India's consumption patterns are changing. Sunil
Khilnani48 suggests there is a new self-belief among the youth in India and that
48 Star Foundation Professor and Director, John Hopkins University, The Paradox of India's New Prosperity (India
2010, Business Standard, 2010), pp. 171-185
their social values are appreciably more liberal than their elders. While there is
a tension between the old values of autarky and Indian nationalism, the rising
demand for economic growth and equality of opportunities across the nation is
changing the dynamics of politics and the social fabric in India. As the country
develops, more of its population can see evidence of new prosperity all around
them and have new expectations and lesser tolerance for inequality. Sunil
Khilnani asks the question, "what if these expectations are not met?" He quotes
Albert Hirshman:
With two lanes of cars in a tunnel, both at a standstill; when one lane begins to
Move, those in the immobile lane will initially begin to feel optimistic, believing
their turn will come soon. After a certain point, if their turn does not come,
they will get Impatient, and then agitated - and someone will break the line
and disrupt traffic. That moment when impatience and anger sets in cannot be
determined in advance, but it will come.
In summary, the culture is changing and people are hopeful of a more
prosperous future. It remains to be seen if the new hopes will be met and if
Political parties firmly adopt a reform oriented, clean political image and
functioning.
5.2. Implications for India
While reforms in reducing self-imposed barriers through taxes, licensing,
reservations and restrictions on investments have led to spectacular economic
performance for the country, primarily led by a buoyant services sector, India still
continues to struggle with its ability to provide improve the productivity of its
agriculture sector and boost its manufacturing. The 2010-2011 Economic Survey
of India acknowledges that the technological breakthroughs achieved in
agriculture through the Green Revolution are gradually waning and India needs
another Green Revolution to bolster productivity (EconomicSurvey, 2010). While
this may seem desperate, I posit that the Government can manage growth in a
sustainable manner by organizing and reviving the retail sector.
ORGANIZE RETAIL TO INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY AND MANAGE INFLATION,
CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT AND INCREASING WAGES - BBNN (SALTER
SWAN MODEL)
A frequent issue that India battles with is the fluctuations in its Inflation
rates. Inflation in India is most commonly reported in terms of the Wholesale
Price Index (WPI), which is a basket of manufactured products (weighted 64
percent), primary articles comprising mainly of food items (weighted 22 percent)
and fuel and energy (remaining 14 percent). The WPI in 2010-11 started with a
double digit 11.0 percent in April 2010, came down to 8.8 percent in August 2010
and went up to 13.6 percent in December 2010. The spurt in December 2010 is
explained by the Finance Ministry in the Economic Survey 2010-11 as being
caused due to supply bottlenecks in vegetables, onions, tomatoes, fruits, milk,
eggs and fish. The supply shock was due to poor monsoons (agriculture in India
is predominantly rain-fed). When combined with growing consumption in India,
including the rural areas and the growing commodity prices globally, inflation
pressures have been accentuated by the demand side pulls combined with supply
shortages. The Reserve Bank of India has been actively tightening interest rates
and raising the cash reserve requirements for banks. Government spending
though has not come down and the Congress is committed to spending more
money on the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) which
promises a hundred days of employment to the rural sector. Inflation targeting
so far has kept the economy managed but the Government and the RBI is walking
a tight rope between slowing down the economy due to severe tightening and
risking hot money flushes due to the rising interest rates.
The slowing down of productivity and the increasing demand and inflation
are creating worries of the Indian economy moving towards being overheated.
Increasingly, the Government of India has been suggesting that organizing the
retail sector and improving the supply chain will reduce the wastage of food
(currently estimated at anywhere between 30-40 percent) and ease the pressure
on inflation. This argument is not without merit. However, for this effort to
work, the Government will need to invest in building infrastructure and
introducing reforms in APMC system. The resulting development of food
processing and other small and medium enterprises can help move workers from
an overcrowded agriculture sector into better quality work, while improving the
overall productivity of the economy. Such sustained development can help India
manage its growth in a changing global economic climate and the resulting
inflationary pressures better. The patterns of movement are shown in Figure 21
- using the BB-NN Model (Rigobon, 2004).
Figure 21: Need for increasing Productivity
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The increasing demand in the economy causes a strain on the Current
Account (balance of payments) causing an increase in CA deficit. Also, as a result
of increasing wages, the standard of living increases, while the economy becomes
less competitive. Both these pressures will cause an increase in inflation
especially if the demand cannot be matched by internal productivity
improvements and supply is constrained due to shocks (weather, disease,
sabotage) and inefficiencies (hoarding due to corruption, wastage). It can be seen
that these factors will potentially negate (or quickly make redundant) any
inflation targeting that the government will do, including measures to curtail
lending, i.e. increase reserve ratios. The only options that the Government will be
left with are capital controls and reducing government spending and/or
increasing taxes. Both, capital controls and fiscal prudence are measures that are
politically difficult - internationally and in the domestic vote bank.
The only alternative India has is to increase Productivity, as shown in
Figure 22.4 By improving productivity, internal demand can be met with
indigenous production or the increase in exports can pay for the imports
required. As inflation is controlled, real incomes will grow, causing an increase in
domestic savings. This productivity improvement can be implemented by
49 The BB-NN model and it's functioning is shown heuristically in Appendix 2
Government led, or Government sponsored, or Market driven approaches. Also,
the Market approaches can be domestic or through foreign participation. Given
the fact that the Indian Government is running a high fiscal deficit, has not been
able to invest in infrastructure development at the rate required, nor has the
domestic private sector been able to develop the supply chain, it makes sense to
invite foreign participation to revive the retail sector. As we have seen in
previous examples of managing foreign investments, India has experience with
such strategic partnerships which can provide a profit to the investors and yet
align with its national interest.
Figure 22: Heuristic depiction of increasing productivity and managing growth
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ORGANIZE RETAIL TO INCREASE TRADE
The philosophy and politics of autarky cause India to neglect potential
opportunities in bilateral trade. This issue is especially pressing in view of the
rise of China and the recent developments where the United States is entering
into bilateral Free Trade Agreements with countries in Latin America. Arvind
Subramanian, in his book India's Turn, suggests that in the context of GATT, to
which India is a founding member, the critics in India continue to clamour for
renegotiation of terms in India's favor, apparently unmindful of the possibility
that India may have exhausted its substantive negotiating options due to
fragmentation of the South East Asia block. Another option that critics suggest is
to accept only those provisions that are in favor or India. Arvind further argues
that the WTO GATT comes as a package and India's options are to take it or leave
it. This brings India to the issue of whether they become a part of a unified
international trading system superseding GATT.
Given the current economic situation in world, and especially given the
impact of the financial crisis on the economy of the United States, now is perhaps
the best time to engage and enter into bilateral trade arrangements with the
United States. Opening of retail to foreign participation, i.e. Wal-Mart was one of
the discussion agenda's that President Obama included in his visit to India in
2010, will invite the much needed capital for infrastructure development,
growing of the small and medium sector enterprises through developments in
cold-chain providers, food-packaging, crafts etc. Yet, from fear of foreign
domination, the traders in India were protesting and applying political pressures
even before he arrived (Service, 2010). As such, the costs of keeping India's
economy shackled are potentially explosive. India is straining at its seams to
grow and every time we restrain this growth for the profit of a few, i.e. traders
and politicians, or suggest that in accordance to our sentiment of self-sufficiency,
we will go it alone, we ignore the economic costs of such inefficiencies and are at
risk of bursting at the seams. If incomes do not grow and the economic balance is
not maintained with smart trade choices, India runs the risk of seeing an increase
in social protests, perhaps even an increase in violence and a coming back of
'religion-based' politics, which since the last few elections have focused more on
economic growth than the divisive politics of religion. Any cynicism towards my
suspected link between economic downturns and increase in politics based on
race, religion and violence may be cast aside when one looks at the current issues
being brought up against President Obama's citizenship and race. While there are
various studies which explore causality between economic progress and social
protests, I do not delve into empirical data to prove this point here. I merely draw
a parallel to the demolition of the Babri Masjid (Mosque) in Ayodhya in 1992.
The demolition by a large group of protestors was said to have been instigated
and led by various political parties, in particular the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
While religion and caste based politics are common place in India, the timing of
the demolition within a year of the India facing its severest economic crisis in
1991, is perhaps telling that economic downturns are directly linked to an
increase in social unrest and divisive politics.
Not increasing trade and opting for appeasement of the traders' lobby may
bring short-term respite to the incumbent Government. However, any
Government which ignores economic reform will do so at its own peril.
5.3. Section Review
The analysis of data received from responses to the DIPP discussion paper
were not adequate to arrive at a proposition for whether India should or should
not open FDI in multi-brand retail. Therefore, I undertook a review of the various
issues that impact this decision and conclude that despite the many economic
reasons for opening of FDI in retail, this sector is currently shackled by India's
own policies and the lack of political will to change status quo.
Using the BB-NN model to demonstrate transitions in economies, I
heuristically conclude that India needs to improve its productivity if it has any
hope of keeping its inflation in check and managing the growth that its people
aspire to. Retail presents an opportunity that is very large and despite the
complexities involved, opening of this sector with appropriate supporting policies
and regulations is an imperative and not an option anymore.
x
CHAPTER 6 - Thematic Response to the DIPP
Discussion Paper
In this section, I provide my perspective to the twelve questions that the GOI has put
forth. I see the questions that the DIPP is asking in four broad themes, being whether
India should open to FDI; and if it does, what will the fate of the unorganized sector,
whether India can take a protectionist stance and how should the government obtain
the right balance between regulation and governance.
Note 1: All answers are assuming that domestic and international organized
retailers will be subject to the same guidelines.
Note 2: Under each theme, I have listed the questions as they appear in Chapter 7
of the DIPP Discussion Paper.
6.1. Should FDI in multi-brand retail be allowed?
7.1. Should FDI in multi-brand retail be allowed? Ifyes, should there be a cap on
FDI? How much should it be?
7.2 Should % FDI investment be marked for growing back-end infrastructure?
7.3 Should a minimum threshold limit for back-end infrastructure development in
dollar terms be specified?
Yes, India should open FDI in multi-brand retail for the simple reason that
two wrongs do not make one right, i.e. while retail is unorganized and inefficient
due to many reasons ranging from lack of employment opportunities, low access
to capital to trading lobbies and politics of coalitions etc, a decision to keep things
at status quo with the logic of protecting the small retailer makes no sense. Only
7 percent of the small retailers say they want their children to do this business;
and their reasons for this answer could range from their inability to grow and
scale this business to the new aspirations of youth. The only people who benefit
from maintaining status quo are those with a vested interest in keeping control of
the supply chain in a Janus faced manner where they have monopsony power
over the producers and monopoly over the customers (i.e. the small retailers
themselves).
Opening of the market should be a calibrated approach. To begin, India
should mandate a cap of 49% foreign equity. While mandating a cap on FDI
increases the perceived risk to the multinational of expropriation by Government
or Joint Venture partner, it will give time and leverage to the Government to put
in place the required infrastructure and mechanism to monitor and develop this
sector. As the industry matures and measures within the competition law are
strengthened, the Government can evaluate increasing the allowed FDI
percentage to afford foreign investors greater control.
Specifying minimum thresholds for back-end investment will be inefficient
due to the fundamental issues of determining what the right number is, and then
trying to adhere to the same. This will create inefficient allocation of capital and
provide incentive for rent seeking behavior from various monitoring agencies. As
is evident from the examples of Maruti Suzuki and ITC discussed in this thesis,
investment in related and supporting industries will happen as a result of the
business strategy and operational needs of large retailers.
6.2. Rural development and the fate of mom & pop stores
7.4 Should conditions be imposed? i.e. 50% ofjobs be reserved for ruralyouth?
7.5 Should a specific % of procurement happen from SMEs?
7.6 Should special wholesale windows for small retailers be mandated, to allow
the small retailers to leverage the supply chain of these large retailers?
7.7 Should this foreign investment be allowed only in cities with population of
more than 1 million (2001 census)
Employment reservations for rural youth cannot be monitored. Also, this
comes with various associated issues of reporting to the labor commissioner,
managing selective employment etc. As pointed out by many respondents, this
suggestion is clientelist and contradicts with the Government asking to restrict
such retail outlets to urban areas. If the government's hope is that such
conditions will ease the issue of urban poverty by offering jobs to rural youth
who are in cities working as laborers, then I view this as a short-term measure,
whereby this may end up attracting more rural youth to migrate to cities.
Practically, reservations for employment provide an escape route to the
government to avoid accountability for low skills development and employment
opportunities for rural youth. This is not recommended.
As acknowledged by Wal-Mart, a minimum local procurement of 50%
should be specified, to encourage the domestic SME business and development of
supporting and related businesses. Currently Wal-Mart, in India, sources 90
percent of it goods and services locally. In view of the FDI approach
demonstrated by Maruti and ITC, it is possible for a multinational to integrate
their business objectives with the developmental goals of the host country. This
approach will allow the building of trust and sustainable development over a
period of time. As suggested by Wal-Mart, for every square foot of multi-brand
retail, the large retailers should develop 1/3 square foot of cash-and-carry stores.
Also, the cash-and-carry stores should extend credit facilities to small retailers.
Restrictions on the basis on population of more than 1 million only will
cause operational inefficiencies due to the geographic locations of the cities.
Conditions on retailers should be defined on the basis of store location (zoning),
minimum size, retailing format etc to ensure that the impact to small retailers can
be minimized. Whether the number of small retailers will increase (as in China)
or decrease (as with the rest of the world) is yet to be seen. However, when
implementing these zoning and format restrictions, policy makers and traders
must be prepared to see a shift in market power to the large retailers. The most
impacted will potentially be the traders as they will lose their customers, i.e.
small retailers to the Cash-and-Carry business of large retailers.
6.3. International negotiations & legal implications
7.8 Will the conditionality's be acceptable under the WTO guidelines / pressure?
Should they be uniformly implemented to domestic retailers? Do conditionality's
infringe on Article 301 of the Constitution of India?
The nature of government protection and support to various industries
including pharmaceuticals, airlines and agriculture around the world is well
documented and debated. The wrangling of such negotiations and the legal
ramifications are difficult to comprehend in the context of this discussion paper.
From the perspective of introducing conditions which provide for balanced
growth in the economic and social interests of the country, India may not be
constrained by TRIMs. However, ensuring all conditionality's are equally
applicable to domestic and international retailer may be a safe position to take,
while allowing for the Indian Government to ensure its national goals are being
met. The opening of FDI in multi-brand retail may open doors for India to
negotiate through multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations to increase its
share of agriculture exports as is productivity increases. The opportunities
afforded by this window cannot be underestimated.
Imposing certain conditions to ensure smooth functioning may not be
inconsistent with the spirit of Article 301 of the Constitution, when read with
other Articles within the Constitution, which allows restrictions and conditions
on trade and commerce if they are for the reason of public good.
6.4. Balance between regulation and governance
7.9 Should a new Act - for Shopping malls be created? Should intervention be at
the national or state levels?
7.10 Should the government retain first right to procure form farmers - for the
public Distribution System - which acts as a safety netfor the poor?
7.11 How will the requirements be enforced / monitored for compliance? Should a
centralized agency be created?
7.12 What should the penalties for non-compliance be?
A regulatory framework which promotes the development of the retail
sector, through clear policy guidelines should be developed. As highlighted
through various comments received by the DIPP, the retail promotion and
regulatory framework should be applicable for small retailers, traders -
wholesale, organized, unorganized, cash-and-carry, and trading through franchise
agreements. The retail sector should be granted industry status which will
facilitate financial incentives, availability of organized financing and established
insurance norms. Also, the enormous number of licenses (approximately 33
licenses are needed as per ICRIER report, annexure 3, pg 135) need to be
streamlined to improve the business climate and reduce rent seeking behavior.
As the Government supports a very large safety net program for people
below the poverty line, the government should retain the right of first
procurement. However, such procurement should be at market prices.
The retail specific regulatory framework may work like the TRAI
(Telecom Regulatory Authority of India5O) and serve as a speedier and more
specialized grievance resolution mechanism. The Competition Act may be further
strengthened to regulate for market failure by creation of monopolies. For
multinationals, violations will be covered under stipulations of the Foreign
Exchange Management Act. Other violations should be referred to the Indian
judicial system as is, for civil or criminal proceedings.
X
so Regulatory body specific to the Telecom industry
CHAPTER 7 - Conclusion
The issue of opening FDI in retail was initially brought up in 1993 and
now, 18 years and many academic publications and political debates later, we are
still far from a resolution. I wrote this thesis with the primary objective of
understanding some of the concerns which have prevented the Government from
allowing FDI in retail; and also to provide a clear picture of what Wal-Mart (as a
proxy for large format international retail) can mean to India. The emphasis of
my thesis is to allow both parties to understand the benefits and concerns of each
other better, so that they may arrive at a solution that is mutually beneficial.
Through various examples, I have demonstrated that such a solution has been
previously adopted by India and thus by leveraging its experience, the opening of
FDI in retail can be replicated with a high probability of success.
Through my research, I have gained a new appreciation for the complexity
of the development issues facing India. It has become abundantly clear to me that
we have some very smart people in the Government, bureaucracy, academia and
the private sector who understand the economic, social and political drivers for
growth and its constraints. Also, given the politics of coalition, I understand the
herculean challenges for the Government to reach consensus on any matter and
the need for immense political courage. Unfortunately, due to the lack of political
courage, Governments choose to follow the path of appeasement and, in trying to
keep everyone happy, tough decisions are over-looked or postponed for another
Minister or Official or Government to consider. It takes a crisis like the Balance of
Payments crisis of 1991 to shock people into action and take the right decisions.
While this is not unique to India, it is perhaps an opportunity for the government
in India to demonstrate that a large and diverse democracy like India can be
united in its economic progress. Raghuram Rajan's speech at the Bombay
Chambers of Commerce on September 10th, 2008 summarizes the situation quite
well:
'many of the reforms in the recent past involved taking off self-imposed
shackles... what needs to be done in years to come requires better, cleverer,
focused government, rather than less government. With the right policies
and some luck, we will become a middle income constitutional democracy (in
my life time); but inaction coupled with bad luck, could make us an unequal
oligarchy or worse, perhaps far sooner than we think... India is far more
resilient that we give it credit for...but it is important for the right minded
people to put their considerable weight behind policies that can set us on the
right track"
In summary, I suggest that arguments to maintain status-quo by
preventing retail to be organized, either by domestic or foreign participation, are
in fact a disguised attempt to keep the poor, poor! While there is no doubt that
international large format retailers will displace the small unorganized retailers
and traders, there is no guarantee that domestic large format retailers will not
cause the same displacement. The difference perhaps will be the learning cost
that the country will need to bear as the domestic large format retailers mature in
their supply chain and retailing processes. A smarter way for the Government
will be to realize the benefits that international large format retailers like Wal-
Mart can bring to the country. India has the experience of managing FDI in a
manner that is consistent with national priorities and I am confident that with
smart regulation and controls, the same results can be achieved in retail by using
FDI. The alternative is to not organize retail, either by domestic investment or
foreign. And even though the Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) report has
suggested this as the preferred action, thankfully this has not stuck well with the
Government and they are not obliged to implement the recommendations of the
JPC. If India does not upgrade and organize its retail sector to eliminate the
inefficiencies and provide a better livelihood for its people, then the country is
making a conscious choice to resign itself to the continued issues of poverty,
farmer suicides, subsidies through large safety net programs etc.
Retail by itself is not a silver bullet, however it is one of the key decisions
that the Government of India needs to implement for economic growth to be
broad based. The first step is to remove the barriers to entry which must then be
followed by a commitment to improve the business climate. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, I posit that India can replicate the success it has had with
companies like Unilever, Maruti, ITC etc. and that Wal-Mart can have a positive
economic impact in India. The first step to achieving this result is to understand
India and Wal-Mart and avoid the trap of mutual ignorance which over time leads
to mutual arrogance. India does not need another crisis to wake-up and make
economic reforms. It only needs to recognize the benefits of mutual collaboration.
I hope my thesis has been able to bring this point home.
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